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L Introduction
Throughout history, scholars have asserted that a developed legal
culture is a precondition for establishment of the rule of law.' Yet, they
have failed to offer any concrete blueprint for creating such a culture. For
post-Soviet Russia this is not a theoretical concern but a practical imperative.
With a "barren legal culture"3 as its legacy from its imperial and socialist
1. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State (Rechtsstaat)
With Special Reference to the Soviet Union, in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN RUSSIA?
POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD 43, 57-58 (Donald D. Barry ed.,
1992) (citing Frieidrich Carl von Savigny) [hereinafter TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN
RUSSIA?]; A.P. Semitko, Russian legal culture. Mythological and socio-economic sources and
premises, Gos I PRAVO, no. 10, 108 (1992); Robert Sharlet, The Fate of Individual Rights in
the Age of Perestroika, in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN RussIA?, supra, at 197, 199.
Gray Dorsey has developed the innovative concept of "jurisculture" to capture this integral
relationship between law and culture. See, e.g., GRAY L. DORSEY, JURISCULTURE: CHINA
(1993); GRAY L. DORSEY, JURISCULTURE: GREECE AND ROME (1988).
2. There are beginning to be some tentative efforts in this direction. See, e.g., KATH-
RYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER: LEGAL REFORM AND LABOR LAW IN THE
SOvIET UNION 178-90 (1996) (considering possible models for evolution and development of
"rule of law" in Russia); Kathryn Hendley, The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian
Legal Culture, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 63 (1995) (testing hypothesis that
transition to market economy is "catalyst for a profound change" in legal culture); John C.
Reitz, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Theoretical Perspectives, in DEMOCRATIC
THEORY AND POsT-COMMuNIST CHANGE (Robert D. Grey ed., 1997) (discussing possible
sources for development of rule of law in post-communist countries).
3. Albert Schmidt, Soviet Legal Developments 1917-1990: A Comment, in TOWARD
THE "RULE OF LAW" IN RUSSIA?, supra note 1, at 339, 341. See generally HAROLD J.
BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 279-82 (rev. ed.
1963); RICHARD S. WORTMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RUSSIAN LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
(1976).
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past, Russia confronts the enormous challenge of constructing a legal tradi-
tion, language, and culture virtually from scratch.'
This Article examines Russian efforts to develop a popular legal con-
sciousness and, ultimately, legal culture during the Second Russian Republic
of January 1994 to the present. It focuses on techniques employed by the
Russian Federation Presidential Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes
(Judicial Chamber), a body specifically created by Boris Yeltsin in Decem-
ber 1993 to assist in effective enforcement, interpretation, and inculcation of
constitutional norms and rules.6 In its brief history, the Judicial Chamber
has wrestled with issues that have challenged more developed legal institu-
tions worldwide. These include the constitutionality of hate speech, pornog-
raphy, unpatriotic speech, limits on public access to government information,
and direct and indirect controls on the media by state and commercial enti-
ties.' In the process, it has made a concerted effort to provide a "public assess-
ment"' of information disputes and to raise citizens' "understanding"9 of the
4. See generally Frances H. Foster, Izvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Reform:
Press, Law, and Crisis in the Post-Soviet Era, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675, 738 (1993);
Frances H. Foster, Procedure as a Guarantee of Democracy: The Legacy of the Perestroika
Parliament, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (1993).
5. For a discussion of Russian legal consciousness and legal culture, see DAVID H.
LEMPERT, DAILY LIFE IN A CRUMBLING EMPIRE: THE ABSORPTION OF RUSSIA INTO THE
WORLD ECONOMY 366-411, 1254-65 (1996); Louise 1. Shelley, Legal Consciousness and the
Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, in TowARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN RUSSIA?, supra note 1, at 63, 63.
For definitions of "legal culture," see, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM:
A SociAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 15 (1975) ("those parts of the general culture - customs,
opinions, ways of doing and thinking - that bend social forces towards or away from the law
and in particular ways"); and MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADI-
TIONS: TEXr, MATERIALS AND CASES 8 (1985) ("the network of values and attitudes relating
to law and practice").
6. Russian Federation Presidential Decree No. 2335 On the Russian Federation Presi-
dential Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes (Dec. 31, 1993), Ross. GAZETA, Jan. 10,
1994, at 4 [hereinafter Judicial Chamber Decree], translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 10, 1994,
at 35.
7. During the lengthy suspension and reorganization of the Russian Constitutional Court,
the Judicial Chamber provided the closest equivalent to judicial review of the constitutionality
of legislation and acts. The Constitutional Court finally resumed operations in March 1995
after a one and one-halfyear iatus. See generally Frances H. Foster, Information and the Prob-
lem of Democracy: The Russian Fxperience, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (1996); Robert Sharlet,
Russian Constitutional Crisis:Law and Politics Under Yeltsin, 9 POST-SoVIET AFF. 314 (1993);
Roundtable: Redesigning the Russian Court, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Summer/Fall 1994, at 72.
8. Ol'ga Bychkova, Court Retires in Favor of Chamber, MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, Jan.
9-16, 1994, at A7, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 13, 1994, at 29.
9. Statement No. 3 On the Russian Press House (May 11, 1994), Ross. GAZETA,
May 21, 1994, at 4.
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appropriate relationship between individual constitutional rights of free speech,
press, and information and the competing interests of the Russian "demo-
cratic" community. 0 Moreover, from the start, the Judicial Chamber has relied
heavily on "publicity" as a powerful sanction and enforcement mechanism.
This Article is based on an examination of Judicial Chamber opinions
published in the newspaper Rossiiskaia gazeta from February 1994 through
December 1996.12 My primary interest is not in the results of these opinions
but rather in the texts themselves. What do they convey to the reader about
the court's definition of itself, the parties before it, its audience, and the rela-
tionship between Russian citizens and institutions? What do these texts commu-
nicate about "law in general and the Constitution in particular?" 3 How do they
contribute to development of a post-Soviet Russian legal discourse and culture?
To answer these questions I turn to a substantial literature by U.S. legal
scholars on how courts attempt to "influence patterns of thought" 4 through
10. For a detailed discussion of these points, see generally Foster, supra note 7.
11. Bychkova, supra note 8, at A7 (citing Anatolii Vengerov).
12. I have chosen Rossiiskaia gazeta because it is the official source for publication of
Judicial Chamber opinions. Statute on the Russian Federation Presidential Judicial Chamber
for Information Disputes art. 23 (Jan. 31, 1994), RosS. GAZErA, Feb. 3, 1994, at 4 [hereinaf-
ter Statute on the Judicial Chamber]. In addition, Judicial Chamber opinions often explicitly
call for publication in Rossiiskaia gazeta. Nonetheless, there are problems with the use of
Rossiiskaia gazeta as a data base. From the start, there has been an ongoing conflict between
the Judicial Chamber and Rossiiskaia gazeta over the newspaper's practice of selective and
abridged publication of opinions. The original legislation required "mandatory publication"
of Judicial Chamber recommendations and "its most important decisions" (Statute on the Judi-
cial Chamber, supra, art. 23) without specifying who determines which decisions are "most
important." In September 1994, the Judicial Chamber issued a special decision clarifying that
it had sole authority to determine which decisions fall under the "most important" category.
Decision No. 23 On an Addendum to the Regulations of the Russian Federation Presidential
Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes (Sept. 2, 1994), in JUDICIAL CHAMBER FOR INFOR-
MATION DISPUTEs: NORMATIVE AcTs, COMMENTARY, SURVEY OF PRACTICE 140 (A.B.
Vengerov ed., 1995) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CHAMBER COLLECTION]. Moreover, the Judicial
Chamber has ruled against Rossiiskaia gazeta in several cases. See, e.g., Decision No. 12
(49) On the Appeal by Russian Federation Press Committee Chairman S.P. Gryzunov Regard-
ing N. Bachurina's March 14, 1995 Publication in "Rossiiskaia gazeta" of "The Thief s Hat
is on Fire" (Apr. 26, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, May 13, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Decision No.
49]. Rossiiskaia gazeta has become a vocal opponent of Judicial Chamber policy and practice.
See, e.g., Vladimir Klimov, The Decision is Final. There is No Appeal. The Judicial Cham-
ber for Information Disputes is Ready to Take Command of the Press of All Russia, Using the
Legal Norms of 1937, Ross. GAZETA, May 13, 1995, at 1. For a complete collection of
Judicial Chamber opinions from February 1994 to March 1995, see JUDICIAL CHAMBER
COLLECTION, supra.
13. JAMEs BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND
LEGAL CRITICISM 113 (1990).
14. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 171 (1985).
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judicial opinions. In particular, I draw on the pioneering work and methodol-
ogy of James Boyd White. Professor White has demonstrated that analysis of
the discourse, rhetoric, and narrative of legal texts, including judicial opin-
ions, can yield new insights into the U.S. legal system.15 A key methodologi-
cal goal of this Article is to offer a critical examination of the application of
these analytical techniques to foreign law, an examination that explores not
just the new insights these techniques can offer but also the dangers inherent
in any attempt to use domestic methodologies to study truly foreign legal
systems.
Part H briefly reviews existing U.S. scholarship on the communicative
functions of judicial opinions. It introduces Professor White's metaphors of
judicial opinion as "performance" and "conversation" and considers possible
extensions of U.S. analytical approaches to comparative study of judicial
opinions.
The remainder of the Article applies White's notions of performance and
conversation in the Russian context. Part III provides the background neces-
sary for evaluating Judicial Chamber opinions. Part IV utilizes White's
performance metaphor to examine the major group of cases decided by
the Judicial Chamber, those involving media dissemination of "harmful
speech."16 I study Judicial Chamber discourse and narrative techniques by
reconstructing the plots and characters of these opinions. Following Professor
White's lead, I place particular emphasis on the Judicial Chamber's "self-
definition" or "self-creation. "
17
Part V poses the question White raises in the United States context:
"What kind of conversation do . . . [these opinions] establish, with what
15. See generally WHITE, supra note 13; JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE
THEIR MEANING: CONSTrUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND
COMMUNITY (1984).
16. For an outstanding discussion of definitions and approaches to "harmful speech" in
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, see generally Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the
Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (1991). Professor D'Amato
identifies two main "types" of harmful speech. Harmful Speech Type I involves cases in
which "the factfinder and/or decisionmaker... does not need to make a judgment as to the
harmfulness of the precise speech in question in order to reach a conclusion that the speech
caused harm .... The harm in all these cases is provable independently from the content of
the speech." Id. at 330. Examples include "speech used to effectuate fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, conspiracy, blackmail, and the like." Id. at 329. Harmful Speech Type II, in contrast,
describes "cases in which the factfinder and/or decisionmaker must arrive at a judgment...
that harm must have occurred because the particular utterance in question is itself harm
producing." Id. at 330. A classic example is a racial epithet that allegedly "causes hurt" to
"members of a particular minority group." Id. As will be seen in Part IV, Russian Judicial
Chamber opinions comprehend both types of "harmful speech."
17. WHrTE, supra note 13, at 103.
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relation to democracy?" ' Not surprisingly, Russian judicial discourse does
not fall easily into either of the "democratic" or "authoritarian" categories
that White uses to describe the range of American judicial discourse. To
provide a more accurate picture of Russian judicial discourse, I rely on a
peculiarly Russian view of the role of law, specifically, the idea of "paren-
tal" law articulated by Harold Berman in 1950.19
Finally, Part VI builds on the analysis of Part V to assess the rewards
and risks of importing domestic legal methodology into comparative law
scholarship. Although use of the sophisticated tools developed in American
legal scholarship can provide valuable insights into foreign legal systems, the
comparative law scholar must adapt those tools to the culture in which the
scholar applies them. Uncritical application of American methodology
without cultural translation distorts the foreign experience.
II. Judicial Opinion as Performance and Conversation:
U.S. Perspectives
In his foreword to a recent University of Chicago Law Review sympo-
sium,2" James Boyd White invited the reader to "imagine a legal world
without the judicial opinion,.. .in which judges would never explain them-
selves .... They would simply decide the cases, issuing orders reflecting
their judgment."21 With the current trend toward decreasing publication of
judicial opinions,22 Professor White's invitation may be less a scholarly
18. Id. at 141.
19. HAROLD J. BmEmN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW pt.
M (1950); see also Harold J. Berman, The Educational Role of the Soviet Court, 21 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 81 (1972) [hereinafter Berman, Educational Role]; Harold J. Berman, The Use
of Law to Guide People to Virtue: A Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Perspectives [hereinafter
Berman, Use of Law], in LAW, JUsTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND LEGAL IsSUEs 75 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977).
20. See Special Issue: Judicial Opinion Writing, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 1363-1519 (1995).
21. James Boyd White, What's an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1363, 1363
(1995).
22. For a discussion of limited publication of U.S. decisions, see, e.g., Martha J.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining
Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U.
L. R v. 757 (1995); Elizabeth M. Horton, Comment, Selective Publication and the Authority
of Precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1691 (1995); William
L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 573 (1981); and William
M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem
for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996). For statistics on the U.S.
Supreme Court's small percentage of written opinions, see The Supreme Court, 1994 Term,
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thought experiment than a preview of the American future. This adds a
certain urgency and poignancy to the question White asks in his title:
"What's an Opinion For?"23
Professor White's response is that an opinion is more than a record of
case outcome; it is also an important vehicle for the court to communicate
with the parties, the legal community, and the lay audience. An opinion
"translates" nonlegal language and experience into the "language of the
law"'U and, at the same time, makes legal language, texts, and acts "intelligi-
ble."' It is a "claim of authority" and "meaning" for the court, its vision of
the world, its "invocation" of the past, and its modes of thought, expression,
and reasoning.' Thus, White concludes that the form as well as result of
an opinion are of critical importance since an opinion "deeply affects and
shapes... the imaginations, minds, and feelings of those who live with the
law. "27
In his earlier work, Professor White has offered two metaphors to assist
us in understanding how courts communicate through opinions. His first
metaphor is judicial opinion as "performance," one that is political and
ethical as well as legal in nature.2 Under this view, the court/author creates
109 HARV. L. REV. 344, 344 (1995) (Table II Final Disposition of Cases reporting that
Supreme Court issued written opinions in only 95 of 7131 cases).
23. White, supra note 21.
24. Id. at 1367.
25. Id. at 1367 n.3.
26. Id. at 1367-68.
27. Id. at 1368-69.
28. See WHITE, supra note 13, at ix ("Even when we think we are simply communi-
cating information, or being rigorously and exclusively intellectual, or just talking, we are in
fact engaged in performances, in relation to others, that are ethical and political in character
and that can be judged as such."). For White's extension of "performance" metaphor to
judicial opinions, see i. at 111-13. This notion of "performance" may be literary, dramatic,
musical, or even terpsichorean. See id. at xii (describing "'language' as a kind of dance, a
series of gestures or performances, measured not so much by their truth-value as by their
appropriateness to context"); JAMES BOYD WHIrE, AcTs OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN
LrrERATURE, LAW, AND PoLrrics 181 (1994) (characterizing Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992), as "drama," with justices defining "themselves as central actors");
JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 761-806 (1973) (comparing judicial opinions to poems); Robert
Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 305, 315 ("Furman... is not so much
a case as a badly orchestrated opera, with nine characters taking turns to offer their own
arias."); James Boyd White, Imagining the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 29, 38 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994) (referring to "dramatic system, a set of speakers and
actors"); see also Irving Younger, On Judicial Opinions Considered as One of the Fine Arts:
The Coen Lecture, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 341 (1980) (comparing judicial opinions to music,
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an elaborate cast of characters in lead and supporting roles. It "gives itself
an ethos, or character, and does the same for both the parties to a case and
for the larger audience it addresses - the lawyers, the public, and other
agencies in government. ,2' The court fashions complex, disparate facts and
events into a coherent plot that leads to an inevitable denouement. 0 The
vehicle may be a tragedy, comedy, farce, or "virtual morality tale."01 The
performance occasionally receives critical acclaim but more often than not
plays to an empty house.32
literature, and painting). I find the analogy to a dramatic performance most persuasive and,
thus, have applied this notion of performance to Russian Judicial Chamber opinions. See infra
Part IV.
29. WHrE, supra note 13, at 102. It should be noted that Professor White does not
restrict this interpretation to the judicial opinion context. He argues that every writer of a
literary or legal text "gives himself a character" and "defines roles" for his reader and others
"about whom [he] speaks." WHITE, supra note 15, at 15, 17-18.
30. For an outstanding discussion of the "rhetoric of inevitability," see Robert A.
Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 213
(1990).
31. David Ray Papke, DischargeAs Denouement: Appreciating the Storytelling of Appel-
late Opinions, 40 3. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 148 (1990). For similar discussions of the "moral
teachings" and "moralizing discourse" of judicial opinions, see, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5
(1983) ("[Elvery narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral.");
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 384 (1989) ("[O]nly in a fully
realized story can we understand the moral teaching .... The narrative does not cause the
teaching of morality; the narrative simply is, or becomes, moralizing discourse."); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation
in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1749, 1800 (1990) ("Each story ends with a 'moral' that legitimates a certain way of under-
standing sex segregation in the workplace."); and Mark L. Walters, American Dreammasters
v. The Cocaine Cowboys: Caplin, Monsanto, and the New Cold War, 69 TEX. L. REV. 159
(1990) (providing detailed discussion of use of moral teachings and moralizing discourse in
judicial narratives).
32. Several recent studies and commentaries reveal that most judicial decisions,
including Supreme Court opinions, "attract neither media nor widespread public attention."
DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 378 (3d
ed. 1993); see Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1463 (1995)
(stating "ordinary people simply do not read judicial opinions"); Mark Tushnet, Style and the
Supreme Court's Educational Role in Government, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 215, 215 (1994)
("Surveys indicate rather low levels of public knowledge about the Court's work in general,
and even lower levels of knowledge about particular decisions."). Frederick Schauer has
suggested that evolving technology, such as online computer research services, may make it
increasingly rare for members of the legal community to read opinions in their entirety.
Schauer, supra, at 1471-72. He also notes that even the law student audience typically reads
opinions only in a "severely edited" form in casebooks. Id. at 1472.
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White's second metaphor is judicial opinion as "conversation. " Under
this interpretation, an opinion is a "form of responsive discourse"33 between
judge/speaker and reader/listener. It creates through language and rhetoric
a "discoursing community" (of judge, reader, and other people discussed in
the opinion)34 with distinctive values and culture 5.3  Each opinion is not an
isolated conversation, however, but rather a "stage" in the larger conversa-
tion that we know as the law.36  Thus, an individual opinion's "consti-
tutive rhetoric '37 and mode of engaging the reader in "law talk"3 may have
broader political, ethical, and legal implications.39
Invoking John Dewey's claim that "[d]emocracy begins in conversa-
tion, "4 Professor White proposes a new standard for evaluating a judicial
opinion: "Is this an invitation to a conversation in which democracy begins
(or flourishes)? Or one in which it ends? ,41 In his application of this test to
U.S. Supreme Court opinions, he finds "democratic" and "authoritarian"
conversations.42 A democratic conversation is one in which the judge
addresses the reader as an equal and invites all to participate in an "open"
dialogue about the law, premised on shared values and "human conditions"
and in language accessible to every citizen.43 An authoritarian conversation,
in contrast, is one that "demands simple and total obedience of its reader"'
33. WHITE, supra note 13, at 100.
34. Id. at 101, 102 (reading opinion "as an act of expression that reconstitutes its own
resources of language and in doing so constitutes a community, directly with its reader and
indirectly with those others in the world about whom it speaks (or towards whom it invites its
reader to take one attitude or another)").
35. Id. at 91, 141 (referring to values and culture).
36. Id. at 101 (describing opinion as "stage" in conversation). For a detailed exposition
of White's view of law as conversation, see generally WHrE, supra note 15.
37. WHITE, supra note 13, at 215. For an earlier discussion of "constitutive rhetoric,"
see generally JAMEs BOYD WHITE, HERACLES Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS
OF THE LAw (1985).
38. I borrow this term from Bruce A. Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State,
92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1084 (1983) ("law talk"). See also Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of
the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAw 187, 190
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (discussing "constitutional law talk").
39. See WHrrE, supra note 13, at xiv, xvi, 104, 202, 216, 223 (discussing political and
ethical dimensions of judicial opinions and legal texts in general).
40. DIALoGuE ON JOHN DEWEY 58 (Corliss Lamont ed., 1959), cited in WHITE, supra
note 13, at 91.
41. WHITE, supra note 13, at 102.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 157.
44. Id. at 101.
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 923 (1997)
to the judge's characterization of fact and law. For White, such a conversa-
tion is "a system of discourse that hardly deserve[s] the name of law."' He
warns that its "consequences are serious indeed. "46
An impressive array of scholars and judges from across the ideological
spectrum share White's view that judicial opinions perform essential com-
municative functions.' As a rapidly growing literature attests, White is also
45. Id. at 111.
46. Id. at 101.
47. The dominant image is that of the court as "teacher" providing through its opinions
"a vital national seminar," Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review,
66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952), in law, politics, and "public values," Owen M. Fiss,
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979). For a comprehensive
discussion and review of the literature on the "educational" functions of the court and its
opinions, see generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institu-
tion?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1992). Other commentators claim that an opinion serves as,
inter alia, a "voice of the spirit reminding us of our better selves," ARCHIBALD Cox, THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 117 (1976), a vision of the
future, see, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, in OF LAW
AND MEN 31, 39 (P. Elman ed., 1956) (stating role of Court is "[t]o pierce the curtain of
the future, to give shape and visage to mysteries still in the womb of time"), and at the
same time, a mooring to the past, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 413 (1986)
("Law's attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice
to show the best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past"), a "framework
for social cooperation," JOHN RAWLS, ATHEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971); Charles Fried, The
Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 Tax. L. REv. 35, 53 (1981) (func-
tion of law is not "the accomplishment of a particular end result" but maintenance of a
"structure within which individuals might pursue a variety of individual aims"), a "critic and
reformer of the general culture," Nagel, supra note 14, at 212, an inspiration for "intelligent
democracy," JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION 6 (1992), national
identity, see, e.g., Eisgruber, supra, political community, see, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The
Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 551, 557 (1985) (noting that Supreme Court builds traditions of political
community), and citizen dialogue and action, see, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION
IN CONFLIcr (1992) (arguing Supreme Court opinions promote public dialogue and con-
flict resolution); Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 147, 158 (1994) (criticizing recent Supreme Court opinions for "doling] little to
contribute to our national dialogues over public policy"); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term - Foreword Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 76-77
(1986) (emphasizing importance of judicial dialogue and "modelling of active self-govern-
ment"), a protection of individual "rights in the face of societal opposition," see, e.g., Robin
West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 43, 85 (1990), a "translator" of legal texts, see, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 234-37 (1980); infra note 67, and
a source of "credibility" and "consistency" for legal actors, institutions, and processes, see,
e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (1995) (discssing judicial "quests for credibility and consis-
tency").
RUSSIAN JUDICIAL CHAMBER DISCOURSE AND NARRATIVE 933
not alone in his concern for how as well as what a court communicates."s
Armed with techniques borrowed from other disciplines (primarily linguistics
and literary criticism),49 U.S. academics, practitioners, and judges have
produced a substantial body of work on the rhetoric, discourse, and style"
48. Even White's harshest critic, Richard Weisberg, supports this view. See RIcHARD
WEISBERG, POETHIcS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 22 (1992) ("mhe
opinion speaks as much through its prose and its structure as through its affirmation or
dismissal of a lower court's decision."). For an example of Weisberg's critical evaluations
of White's work, see, e.g., id. at 224-50. See also Emily Fowler Hartigan, From Right-
eousness to Beauty: Reflections on Poethics and Justice as Translation, 67 TUL. L. REV. 455
(1992) (discussing Weisberg's "scathing account of White"). For other critical reviews
of White's work, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Conversing about Justice, 100 YALE L.J.
1855 (1991); Mark V. Tushnet, Translation as Argument, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 105
(1990).
49. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw AND LrrERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
270-71 (1988) (discussing study of judicial opinions "from the standpoint of linguistics and
rhetoric or from that of literary criticism - or perhaps from both standpoints, especially since
they are merging"). The use of linguistics and literary criticism has gained wide currency
among U.S. legal scholars. It has even spawned the new fields of "Law and Linguistics" and
"Law and Literature." For a sampling of the literature, see generally SANFORD LEVINSON &
STEVEN MAILLOUX, INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (1988)
[hereinafter INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE]; WEISBERG, supra note 48, at 253 n.2;
Symposium on Law, Literature, and the Humanities: Outside the Tradition: Literature as Legal
Scholarship: The Call to Stories: 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 95 (1994); and What is Meaning in a
Legal Text? Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistics Conference,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1995). For critical evaluations of the Law and Literature movement,
see generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid
Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991); and Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not
Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV.
203 (1986). For a comprehensive study of law-as-literature and law-in-literature, see gener-
ally John Fischer, Reading Literature/Reading Law. Is There a Literary Jurisprudence?, 72
TEX. L. REV. 135 (1993). Some scholars have preferred a related interdisciplinary approach,
that of "literary anthropology." Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE
J.L. & HuMAN. 1, 49 (1988); see Lisa A. Binder, "With More than Admiration He Admired":
Images of Beauty and Defliement in Judicial Narratives of Rape, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
265, 265-66 (1995) (applying Weisberg's approach of "literary anthropology" to rape cases
and explaining that "literary component... lies in its focus on appellate opinions as texts
rather than expositions of the current law of rape"). "The anthropological component, in turn,
describes what this language reveals about the broader cultural assumptions at work in the
context of violent crimes against women." Id. For a critical view of this "borrowing" from
other disciplines, see generally Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory
in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 1991 DUKE L.J.
191, 195 (criticizing use of "humanistic theory," defined as "especially philosophical theory,
but also literary, cultural, and social theory").
50. For a discussion of various definitions of these terms, see POSNER, supra note 49,
at 268-72; and Richard A. Posner, Judge's Writing Styles (AndDo They Matter?), 62 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1421, 1421-26 (1995). See generally THE RHETORIC OF LAw, supra note 28 (pro-
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of judicial opinions, with close attention to the use of language,"1 word
order, 2 metaphor,53 hyperbole,54 tone,55 and the like.
What has emerged in the process is a recognition of the important role of
judicial "storytelling" or "narrative" as a communicative device. 6 This has
viding collection of essays exploring definition and use of "rhetoric" in law). The interest in
judicial style is not solely a recent phenomenon. For example, in a 1925 essay Benjamin
Cardozo insisted on the critical importance of the form as well as the substance of judicial
opinions: "The strength that is born of form and the feebleness that is born of the lack of form
are in truth qualities of the substance. They are tokens of the thing's identity. They make it
what it is." Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 14 YALE REV. 699, 700 (1924-25).
For another important early examination of judicial writing, see generally Walker Gibson,
Literary Minds and Judicial Style, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 915 (1961).
51. See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial Figure, 55 U. CH. L. REV.
506, 536-38 (1988) (analyzing Holmes' use of language, including first-person pronoun and
possessives, in Lochner v. New York dissent); Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk
About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles
of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 954, 962-83 (1993) (discussing "fiduciary"
rhetoric and discourse); Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication,
in BILLY BUDD, SAILOR, With an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 45-
49 (1982) (discussing Justice Rehnquist's employment of language to "deneutralize" facts and
law through, inter alia, use of adverb "concededly"); and Richard H. Weisberg, Law, Liter-
ature, and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDozo L. REv. 283, 309-15 (1979) (praising
Cardozo's style and use of language).
52. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARD OZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 51 (1990)
(describing "Cardozo's rhetorically effective use of irregular word order").
53. See generally Binder, supra note 49 (discussing use of "beauty and the beast"
metaphor in rape opinions); Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aural-
ity, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOzO L. REv. 229 (1994)
(discussing visual and aural metaphors); Laura Krugman Ray, The Figure in the Judicial
Carpet: Images of Family and State in Supreme Court Opinions, 37 J. LEGAL EDuC. 331, 332-
33 (1987) (describing use of colorful metaphors in Michael Musmanno's opinions); HAIG
BOsMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1992); Steven L. Winter, Death
is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 30, at216 (discussing use of hyperbole); Gerald B.
Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REv. 1545, 1589-90 (1990)
(discussing overstatement and overclaiming).
55. See generally Richard Delgado, Scorn, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1061 (1994)
(discussing use of "scornful humor" in Supreme Court opinions); Note, Judicial Humor: A
Laughing Matter?, 41 HAST. L.J. 175 (1989) (pointing out damaging effects of judicial
humor); Weisberg, supra note 28, at 353 (referring to Marshall's dissent in Zant v. Stephens
as "full of the outrage of one who has been cheated and lied to. He speaks in disbelief.., as
one who has accepted the romantic due process account and now is bewildered as the Court
reads it out of its own historical memory.").
56. But see Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225 (1989) (discussing limitations on "law
as narrative" approach). Legal academics' interest in "storytelling" or "narrative" as a form
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led to a new appreciation of the extent to which judges engage in fact-"spin-
ning,"57 "master narratives," 8 and other storytelling techniques to make out-
comes appear unavoidable 5 9 to elicit empathy,' to organize precedent, 61 to
of communication is by no means confined to the context of judicial opinions. As Richard
Delgado has observed, "Everyone has been writing stories these days. And I don't just mean
writing about stories or narrative theory, important as those are. I mean actual stories, as in
'once-upon-a-time' type stories." Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2411 (1989). For a sampling of the
literature, see generally LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); PATRICIA
J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the
Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a Black
Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity, "Blunders, " and Transformation in Outsider Narratives,
82 VA. L. REV. 69 (1996); James R. Elkins, A Bibliography of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC.
203 (1990); Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990); Symposium on Legal
Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989). For a critical review of the literature, see
generally Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Sef. Autobiographical Performances in Outsider
Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995); and Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993).
Narrative analysis is used extensively by anthropologists as well as legal scholars. For a
recent discussion of the literature, see generally Rebecca R. French, Of Narrative in Law and
Anthropology, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 417 (1996).
57. Wald, supra note 47, at 1386.
58. See generally Papke, supra note 31 (discussing role of master narratives in judicial
opinions, especially in cases on consumer bankruptcy).
59. See, e.g., Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and
Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1940 (1990) (finding "recreation and distortion" of facts is
important part of Supreme Court's "judicial voice"); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2085-93 (1989) (discussing how construction of facts "lead[s]
judgment in different directions"); Wald, supra note 47, at 1387-88 ("Judges decide outcomes,
and then tell the story in a way that makes the outcome look like a perfectly logical and
necessary consequence of the law, handed to us from above, as applied to the facts, handed
to us from below.").
60. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 31, at 409-13 (claiming narrative can elicit empathy for
suffering of people we find unfamiliar); Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White
Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. &MARY L. REv. 1, 39 (1990) (same). For broader
discussions of empathy, see generally Lynn Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 1574 (1987); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New
Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989); and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning: Post-Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 287 (1992).
61. See, e.g., RICHARD H. WEISBERG, WHEN LAWYERS WRITE 10-11 (1987) (discussing
how appellate judges use narrative to "denigrat[e]" "[p]recedents contra"). See generally
Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism:Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937
(1990) (arguing that judges and lawyers use narratives to take historical materials and develop
coherent and relevant argument); Wald, supra note 47, at 1411 (describing judicial use of
storytelling techniques to explain precedent).
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humanize abstract legal theories and norms,62 to palliate harsh results, 63 to
reinforce the legal and moral authority of the decision and decisionmaker,64
and to exclude alternative arguments, interpretations, and perspectives. 65
This application of discourse and narrative analysis to judicial opinions
has had considerable value. It has enabled scholars to go beyond examina-
tion of the merits and resolution of the case at hand and explore broader
issues, such as how a court defines its own authority and mission, its rela-
tionship to its audience and external legal actors and texts, and the language,
meaning, and reach of the law. In so doing, these approaches may also help
shed light on the very nature of law itself. As Robert Cover observed in his
seminal article Nomos and Narrative, "Once understood in the context of the
narratives that give it meaning law becomes not merely a system of rules to
be observed, but a world in which we live. "66 Moreover, if John Dewey is
correct that democracy begins in conversation, then the study of the "conver-
sation" between judge and reader that White urges may even provide signals
about the overall status and prospects for democracy in a given society.
62. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 52, at 43-45, 93 (explaining Cardozo's techniques of
appealing to "lay understanding" of legal concepts); Ferguson, supra note 51, at 546 (discuss-
ing Holmes' efforts to "reach... for the largest audience" and "to reduce the most complex
case to simple, manageable terms").
63. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 50, at 1441 (describing "padding of opinions" and
stating that "[tlhe unnecessary details and truisms that stud most judicial opinions create a
soothing facade of facticity"); Wald, supra note 47, at 1398 ("When the writer realizes that
a quick look at the result is likely to arouse apprehension in the reader, she will stress what
the opinion is not holding, and what its reasoning is not based on.").
64. See, e.g., L. H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE
RHETORIC OF AuTHoarry 72-73 (1995) (describing how John Marshall's narrative in
McCulloch v. Maryland gave judiciary authority by suggesting "judges are trustworthy because
they act from duty, not desire ... [and] stand above the fray and thus can bring peace");
Ferguson, supra note 30, at 205 (discussing judicial "self-dramatizing," "stressing the
importance of the decision that only they can make"); Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice
and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 543, 583 (1988)
(noting potential for "discursive tyranny ... through deceitful manipulation of plot").
65. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1025, 1058-59 (1994) (describing judicial narrative of "imposition," which "view[s] outsiders
as overstepping, as asking for more than they deserve, as imposing on our good natures and
generosity" and serves "to deprive the reformer of legitimacy"); Christopher P. Gilkerson,
Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client
Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 871 (1992) (discussing how "universalized narratives exclude
alternative voices and perspectives"). See generally David Luban, Difference Made Legal:
The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. Rnv. 2152 (1989) (contrasting "official" narrative of
Supreme Court with "excluded" narrative of Martin Luther King); Lucie E. White, Subordina-
tion, Rhetorical Survival ills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF.
L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing how categories of law can suppress outsiders' stories).
66. Cover, supra note 31, at 4-5.
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Despite the potential contributions of discourse and narrative analysis,
the techniques are seldom employed in comparative law scholarship on
judicial opinions. This may in large part reflect the formidable challenge of
linguistic and cultural translation. 67 As substantial U.S. literature reveals,
legal scholars and practitioners find the problems they encounter within their
own system daunting and humbling.68 These difficulties are, of course, only
magnified in the comparative law context. 6' Yet, the few scholarly efforts
to negotiate these linguistic and cultural differences have confirmed the value
of studying foreign as well as U.S. opinions through the prism of discourse
and narrative analysis. For example, two recent articles published in the
Yale Law Journal and Wisconsin Law Review used these techniques to
debunk long-held comparative law perceptions of the French judiciary as
67. See generally Talal Asad, The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social
Anthropology, in WRrriNG CULTURE: THE PoETIcS AND PoLrIcs OF ETHNOGRAPHY 141
(James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986) (claiming that it is impossible to communi-
cate any aspect of foreign culture without "cultural translation" that also conveys social context
of that aspect).
68. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1211,
1266 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation] (describing the task of translation as
"despairingly difficult" and properly "conditioned by a constraint of humility"). For other
superb work on law and "translation," see generally WHrrE, supra note 13; Clark D. Cunning-
ham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal
Discourse, 77 COR IEL L. Ray. 1298 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients:
Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Gilkerson, supra note 65;
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV.
395 (1995); and James Boyd White, Translation as a Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1388 (1992). In a recent provocative article, Jim Chen has called for a modification of the
"translation" metaphor to emphasize "how one masters any language, much less the language
of the law." Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263,
1272 (1995).
69. As Lawrence Lessig has aptly noted, "To translate we must speak another Ian-
guage .... 'Language' is more than words people use; it is their ideals, their hopes, their
prejudices, their enlightenments - in short, it is their world. As the distance to that world
increases, so too does the difficulty of the task of translation .... " Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, supra note 68, at 1266. The issue of "translation" has been a matter of central
concern to comparative law scholars. For example, at a 1993 Chinese law conference at the
University of British Columbia, we discussed at length our considerable "methodological
anxiety" about the ethnographer's "paradox" we confront in our teaching and scholarship -
the need to "render the foreign familiar and preserve its very foreignness at one and the same
time." Vincent Crapanzano, Hermes'Dilemma: The Masking of Subversion in Ethnographic
Description, in WRrrING CULTURE, supra note 67, at 51, 52. For outstanding discussions of
this problem of cultural translation in the Chinese law context, see generally Janet E. Ains-
worth, Categories and Culture: On the 'Rectification of Names' in Comparative Law, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 19 (1996) [hereinafter Kensworth, Categories and Culture]; and Janet E.
Ainsworth, Interpreting Sacred Texts: Preliminary Reflections On Constitutional Discourse
In China, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 273 (1992) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Interpreting Sacred Texts].
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"passive applicator"70 of code provisions and to offer new perspectives and
approaches to hate speech based on a comparative study of Canadian and
U.S. narratives.7'
Thus far, scholarly attempts to apply discourse and narrative analysis
in the comparative law context have tended to focus on established Western
legal systems with familiar judicial organs and materials that are relatively
accessible to the foreign observer. In post-Soviet Russia, this Article con-
fronts a very different situation - a foreign legal system that is in flux, a
quasi-judicial organ that defies categorization, and opinions that are pub-
lished sporadically and are unavailable in translation. Perhaps, then, it is not
surprising that when this Article asks questions developed in the U.S.
context, it finds new answers, answers that can be explained only by the
distinctive features of Soviet/Russian law.
Iff. Setting the Stage: The Author and Its Opinions
On December 31, 1993, Boris Yeltsin issued a presidential decree estab-
lishing a permanent Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes.' The new
body was the successor to the short-lived Information Arbitration Tribunal,
a quasi-judicial organ instituted in October 1993 to monitor and ensure fair,
full, and equal media coverage of Russia's fall 1993 election and constitu-
tional referendum campaigns.7 3
70. Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the
French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1385 (1995).
71. See generally Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of
American and Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, 1994 Wis. L. REV.
1425; see also WEISBERG, supra note 28 (using rhetorical and narrative analysis to examine
law in Vichy France during World War II); Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England,
France and Soviet Russia, 48 TUL. L. REv. 1010 (1974) (comparing judicial "style" in
England, France, and Russia); John W. Van Doren, Things Fall Apart, or Modern Legal
Mythology in the Civil Law Tradition, 2 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 447 (1993) (using White's
analysis ofjudicial style to study French, German, and U.S. abortion opinions); Jan M. van
Dunn6, Narrative Coherence and Its Function in Judicial Decision Making and Legislation,
44 AM. J. COMP. L. 463 (1996) (narrative analysis of Dutch law).
72. See Judicial Chamber Decree, supra note 6.
73. Id. arts. 1-2 (indicating Judicial Chamber based on "constructive activity" and "posi-
tive experience" of Information Arbitration Tribunal). For information on the Information
Arbitration Tribunal, see generally Melissa Dawson, Case Study in Media Regulation: The
1993 Elections and the Information Arbitration Tribunal, POST-SOVIET MEDIA L. & POL'Y
NEWSL., Sept. 10, 1994, at 10; and Melissa Dawson, Free Speech and the Mass Media in
Russia: Lessons from the December 1993 Election and Constitutional Referendum, 13
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 881 (1995). Information Arbitration Tribunal documents are
collected in INFORMATION ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL AND THE FIRST FREE ELECTIONS:
COLLECTION OF NORMATIVE ACTS AND DOCUMENTS (Iu. M. Baturin ed., 1994).
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The Judicial Chamber consists of a panel of seven media specialists
under the chairmanship of law professor Anatolii Borisovich Vengerov.
Judicial Chamber members represent a wide variety of professional back-
grounds and communities - academic, legislative, administrative, and
journalistic.74 Five of the seven members served on the Information Arbitra-
tion Tribunal. 5
The initial presidential decree and subsequent founding Statute76 assign
the Judicial Chamber sweeping and vaguely-defined responsibilities. The
"main task" is to help the Russian President "exercise his constitutional
powers as guarantor of rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests in the mass
information sphere enshrined in the Russian Federation Constitution. ' n
Other duties include guaranteeing objectivity, accuracy, equality, and plural-
ism in the mass media, protecting the moral interests of children and adoles-
cents, resolving disputes about allocation of airtime between legislative
factions, correcting factual errors in media reports, and providing mass
media-related draft legislation, expert advisory opinions on application of
statutes, and "rulings" on presidential decrees.78
The Judicial Chamber has authority to resolve "information disputes and
other matters" involving norms established in the Russian Constitution, laws,
and presidential edicts, "universally recognized principles and norms of
international law," Russian Federation international treaties, "journalistic
ethics," and "generally-accepted ethical norms."79 Thus far, the Judicial
Chamber has concentrated on two major issues - media dissemination of
allegedly harmful materials and government interference with mass media
activities.80 There are only two express limitations on Judicial Chamber
74. The seven members are Anatolii Vengerov (law professor), Igor Eremin and
Aleksandr Kopeika (members of the Mass Media Committee of the former Supreme Soviet),
Viktor Monakhov (Chief of the Russian Federation Regional (Northwestern Russia) State
Inspectorate for Defense of Freedom of the Press and Mass Information), Marina Paniarskaia
(law student at Mass Communications School), Iurii Feofanov (legal affairs commentator for
Izvestiia and editor of Zakon), and Igor Ivanov (chief specialist of the Central Electoral
Commission's department for electoral arbitration and preparation of normative documents).
See Peter Krug, Information Tribunal Made Permanent Under President's Supervision, POST-
SOVMT MEDIA L. & POL'YNEWSL., Jan. 27, 1994, at 1, 4.
75. The five are: Vengerov, Eremin, Kopeika, Monakhov, and Paniarskaia.
76. Statute on the Judicial Chamber, supra note 12.
77. Id. art. 2.
78. Id. arts. 4, 5, 9, 21; Judicial Chamber Decree, supra note 6, art. 3. Interestingly,
the original presidential decree also authorizes the Judicial Chamber to issue warnings to
the mass media. Id. art. 3, 8. This "function" is omitted in the Statute on the Judicial
Chamber.
79. Statute on the Judicial Chamber, supra note 12, arts. 3, 8, 12.
80. A study of Judicial Chamber statements and recommendations suggests that there
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competence. It cannot examine disputes that are "assigned by law to the
jurisdiction of Russian Federation courts""' or those pertaining to information
protected by law as a "state, commercial, or other secret."'
Despite its broad charter to monitor, implement, and create norms in the
mass information sphere, the Judicial Chamber's prescribed enforcement
powers are modest. According to the Statute on the Judicial Chamber, it has
the authority to reprimand officials and journalists, to order rectification of
factual errors, and to "raise" with the "appropriate" organs or personnel the
need for more stringent remedies, such as written warnings, administrative
or criminal proceedings, or termination of media outlets. 3 The Judicial
may be a third major category of claims emerging - those dealing with intellectual property
issues. See, e.g., Statement No. 4 Against Political Ambitions (June 29, 1994), Ross.
GAZETA, July 13, 1994, at 3 (discussing Judicial Chamber conflict with State Duma over its
determination that time schedules for television and radio programs are intellectual property
of television-radio company); Recommendation No. 4 On the Legal Nature of ITAR-TASS
Materials (Oct. 14, 1994), ROSS. GAZETA, Oct. 22, 1994, at 5 (involving ITAR-TASS
General Director requesting clarification of copyright status of reports, commentaries, video
and photographic materials, etc. disseminated to consumers of information). For a detailed
description of the entire body of Judicial Chamber opinions, see generally Frances H. Foster,
Freedom with Problems: The Russian Judicial Chamber on Mass Media, 3 PARKER SCH. J.
E. EuR. L. 141 (1996).
81. Statute on the Judicial Chamber, supra note 12, art. 8.
82. Id. art. 9. The Judicial Chamber has consistently read these jurisdictional restric-
tions narrowly. For example, it has repeatedly claimed competence to hear disputes involving
slander or libel of public officials, matters that arguably fall exclusively within the jurisdiction
of Russia's ordinary court system. See, e.g., Decision No. 11 (48) On the Appeal by the
Chairman of the GKAP of Russia, L. Bochin, Regarding E. Chernyi's Publication "Mysteri-
ous Pages from the Biography of a Member of Government" in the Newspaper "Izvestiia" on
March 24, 1995 (Apr. 20, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, May 13, 1995, at 5 [hereinafter Decision
No. 48] (rejecting argument that suits for defense of honor and dignity belong in ordinary
courts and are, thus, outside jurisdiction of Judicial Chamber). It has asserted jurisdiction on
grounds that such cases are not purely private civil actions but also constitute "information
disputes that have a public-legal character and social significance." Decision No. 30 On the
Appeal to the Judicial Chamber by State Duma Chairman I. P. Rybkin Regarding the Publica-
tions in the Weekly "Sobesednik" Entitled "How Much is the Honor of 22 Female State Duma
Deputies Worth?" [No. 37] and "Lie Down, the Court is Coming" [No. 36] (Oct. 25, 1994),
Ross. GAZETA, Nov. 1, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Decision No. 30].
83. Statute on the Judicial Chamber, supra note 12, arts. 11-14. In actual practice,
the Judicial Chamber has ranged well beyond the remedies stipulated in its Statute. For
example, it has directed newspapers to dismiss editors-in-chief. See Decision No. 11 On the
Publication in "Ekspress-gazeta," No. 5 (March 1994) of "Some People Know How to Live!"
(Apr. 21, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Apr. 29, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Decision No. 11] (proposing
founders of Ekspress-gazeta dismiss editor-in-chief). Rossiiskaia gazeta immediately criti-
cized this move as a violation of the Judicial Chamber's limited enforcement powers specified
in the Statute on the Judicial Chamber. See Aleksandr Batygin, "They Ask the Press not to
Worry," Ross. GAZETA, Apr. 29, 1994, at 4, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 2, 1994, at
940
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Chamber has the right to demand "necessary" materials from government
agencies and media editorial offices and written explanations of unethical
actions from editorial offices, officials, and journalists.8 Judicial Chamber
decisions are binding and not subject to appeal.85 Government organs and
personnel "to whom a decision is addressed" must report to the Judicial
Chamber within two weeks on their compliance with the decision. 6
28. The Judicial Chamber has proposed that official bodies repeal legislation, decrees, and
decisions. See, e.g., Decision No. 29 On the Conflict between the Primorskii Krai Ad-
ministration and the Editorial Office of "Krasnoe znamia" (Oct. 14, 1994), Ross. GAZETA,
Oct. 20, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Decision No. 29] (proposing Primorskii krai government
revoke edicts). In many opinions, the Judicial Chamber has also offered general recom-
mendations and reforms inspired by the case at hand. These have included suggestions for
new or amended legislation, see, e.g., Decision No. 33 On the Appeal by the Editors of
"Selskaia nov'" and "Udarnik" (Brianskaia oblast') Regarding the Obligation to Publish
Materials Sent to Newspapers by Deputies of the State Duma and the Federation Council of
the Russian Federation Federal Assembly (Nov. 25, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Dec. 29, 1994,
at 4 [hereinafter Decision No. 33] (requesting State Duma clarify definition of "state mass
media" in Law on the Status of Deputies); Decision No. 7 (44) On the Appeal to the Judicial
Chamber for Information Disputes by the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal
Assembly Regarding the VGTRK Television Program "Newspaper Histories" ["Fascism in
Russia. Who?"] of February 22, 1995 (Mar. 15, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, Mar. 29, 1995, at
13 [hereinafter Decision No. 44] (calling for new legislation on the "struggle against Fas-
cism")) and "orderly" rules for accreditation and access ofjournalists, see, e.g., Decision No.
37 On the Murmansk Oblast' Administration's Denial of Journalists' Access to Information
(Dec. 27, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Jan. 11, 1995, at 4 [hereinafter Decision No. 37] (recom-
mending Murmansk government adopt accreditation rules); Decision No. 2 (39) On Violation
of the Professional Right of ITAR-TASS Journalist T.N. Zamiatina to Receive and Dissemi-
nate Information (Jan. 29, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, Feb. 2, 1995, at 15 [hereinafter Decision
No. 39] (recommending improvements in federal system for admitting journalists to official
events). The Judicial Chamber has also admonished the press "to be more careful in verifying
facts and information," Decision No. 6 (43) On the Appeal by N.E. Fonareva, Deputy
Chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support
of New Economic Structures (Feb. 21, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, Mar. 23, 1995, at 5 [hereinaf-
ter Decision No. 43], and called for stricter government enforcement of mass media legisla-
tion, see, e.g., Decision No. 21 On Mass Media Publications that Incite Social and Nationalist
Intolerance (July 14, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Aug. 4, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Decision No. 21]
(expressing need to improve enforcement of mass media legislation). It has even offered
advice regarding improvements in media content and coverage. Id. (suggesting that there is
inadequate press coverage of procuratorial efforts to prevent violations of Law on the Mass
Media).
84. Statute on the Judicial Chamber, supra note 12, arts. 18-19.
85. Id. art. 10.
86. Id. In addition, in cases where the Judicial Chamber has sent materials to an
"appropriate" organ regarding a violation of mass information rights and freedoms, that organ
must report the results of its examination to the Judicial Chamber within one month. Id. art.
13.
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From the start, the status of the Judicial Chamber within the Russian
legal system has been an open question. The Judicial Chamber formally
operates within the presidential administration. Its staff is appointed by the
President and its activities are financed out of the presidential budget.87 Yet,
according to its Statute, the Judicial Chamber is an "independent" and
"impartial body."88 As its Chairman Anatolii Vengerov often emphasizes,
even the President himself cannot interfere in its activities.89
In addition, the Judicial Chamber does not fit neatly into any existing
legal or institutional category. To a certain extent, it operates as a court.
It examines written petitions from claimants' or brings proceedings on its
87. Id. arts. 1, 7, 24, 26, 31, 32.
88. Id. arts. 3, 28.
89. See, e.g., Anatolii Vengerov, Remarks at Press Conference at the Russian-American
Press and Information Center (Sept. 6, 1994), translated in POST-SOVIET MEDIA L. & POL'Y
NEWSL., Oct. 15, 1994, at 3, 3 ("We are independent. Even the President cannot interfere
in our activities.").
90. Claimants have included journalists, see, e.g., Decision No. 16 On Violations of
Legal and Ethical Norms in Conducting the Paid Game "05" with the Use of the Mass Media
(June 2, 1994), Ross. GAz.TA, June 8, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Decision No. 16] (journalist
claiming she was defrauded by television lottery); Decision No. 39, supra note 83 (including
ITAR-TASS journalist claiming that Kremlin guards' refusal to admit her to Public Chamber
meeting violated her professional right to receive and disseminate information), newspaper
editors, see, e.g., Decision No. 33, supra note 83 (involving newspaper editors challenging
the right of legislators to demand publication of submitted materials as violation of Law on the
Mass Media), and media organizations, see, e.g., Decision No. 2 On the Appeal by the Guild
of Parliamentary Journalists (Feb. 17, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Feb. 23, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter
Decision No. 2] (discussing Guild of Parliamentary Journalists protesting refusal of Russian
Federation government to admit journalists into meetings). The Judicial Chamber has also
received numerous petitions from government officials, see, e.g., Decision No. 49, supra note
12 (regarding Press Committee Chairman claiming Rossiiskaia gazeta article defamed and
discredited him as government leader and undermined professional reputation of Press
Committee), parliamentary deputies, see, e.g., Decision No. 25 On Unlawful Actions with
Respect to the Editor-in-Chief of "Sovetskaia Kalmykiia" (Sept. 22, 1994), Ross. GAZETA,
Oct. 11, 1994, at 4 (involving State Duma deputy requesting that Judicial Chamber resolve
conflict over unlawful firing of Sovetskaia Kalmykiia's editor-in-chief by one of newspaper's
founders), and federal and regional legislative, judicial, and administrative bodies, see, e.g.,
Decision No. 6 On I. Dement'eva's Article "War and Peace in the Prigorodnii Raion"
Published in the Newspaper "Izvestiia" (Mar. 11, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Mar. 31, 1994, at
5 [hereinafter Decision No. 6] (Republic of North Ossetia Supreme Soviet Chairman and
Plenipotentiary Representative claiming that Izvestiia article undermined normalization of
relations between Republic of North Ossetia and Ingush Republic); Decision No. 14 On the
Registration of "AI'-Kods" (May 19, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, May 27, 1994, at 3 (involving
Constitutional Court requesting that Judicial Chamber examine legality of registration of
newspaper founded by foreign citizen); Decision No. 13 (50) On the Appeal by the State
Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly to the Judicial Chamber for Information
Disputes Regarding S. Parkhomenko's Publication "We Must Choose Better" in the Newspa-
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own initiative. 9' It holds open hearings? at which it considers evidence and
oral testimony from parties and/or their "representatives, '94 expert wit-
nesses,9 and other concerned persons.9 It evaluates factual and legal issues
per "Segodnia" (May 11, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, May 23, 1995, at 12 [hereinafter Decision
No. 50] (regarding State Duma claiming that Segodnia article insulted deputies and voters).
Occasionally, special interest groups, see, e.g., Decision No. 5 On Violations of the Russian
Federation Constitution's Norms on Equality of Women (Mar. 11, 1994), Ross. GAZETA,
Mar. 22, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Decision No. 5] (considering Women's Union of Russia and
Union of Lawyers protesting publication of advertisements for job openings limited to male
applicants only), and ordinary citizens seek Judicial Chamber assistance as well, see, e.g.,
Decision No. 21, supra note 83 (involving private citizens and social organizations requesting
Judicial Chamber examination of racist, fascist, and subversive newspapers).
91. See, e.g., Decision No. 7 On Violations of Legal and Ethical Norms in Publications
in the Weekly "Novyi vzgliad" (Mar. 17, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Mar. 26, 1994, at 4
[hereinafter Decision No. 7] (Judicial Chamber on its own initiative examining "immoral,"
"offensive" publications in Novyi vzgliad).
92. For details on Judicial Chamber procedures for examining disputes, see generally
Regulations of the Russian Federation Presidential Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes
(Feb. 10, 1994), in JUDICIAL CHAMBER COLLECTION, supra note 12, at 13 [hereinafter
Judicial Chamber Regulations].
93. As reported in Judicial Chamber opinions, the most common forms of evidence are
newspaper articles, see, e.g., Decision No. 15 On Violations of Legal and Ethical Norms in
Publications in the Newspaper "Zavtra" (June 2, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, June 8, 1994, at 3
[hereinafter Decision No. 15] (involving Judicial Chamber examination of content of Zvtra
articles entitled "World Evil" and "Kremlin Secrets"), and videotaped television broadcasts,
see, e.g., Decision No. 32 On the Appeal to the Judicial Chamber by I.P. Rybkin, Chairman
of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, Regarding the VGTRK
Television Program "Big Scandal" of November 1, 1994 (Nov. 25, 1994), Ross. GAZETA,
Dec. 17, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Decision No. 32] (discussing Judicial Chamber examination
of videotape of television program "Big Scandal"). Also frequently mentioned are any prior
official rulings regarding the action or parties, see, e.g., Decision No. 6, supra note 90 (con-
sidering prior enactment of North Ossetian legislature that condemned article at issue in case),
media founding and registration documents, see, e.g., Decision No. 29, supra note 83 (exam-
ining Krasnoe znamia's founding documents to determine authority of one of two co-founders
to appoint new editor-in-chief), and unspecified materials submitted by the parties, see, e.g.,
Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (noting Judicial Chamber studied additional materials submit-
ted by the parties' representatives in deciding that Ekspress-gazeta article violated legal and
ethical norms).
94. See, e.g., Decision No. 48, supra note 82 (noting testimony by plaintiff's and
defendant's "representatives").
95. See, e.g., Decision No. 7, supra note 91 (noting Judicial Chamber heard opinions
of "experts - Professor B.S. Polozhii and Candidate of Pedagogical Science, Honored
Teacher M.B. Tsentsiper" regarding content of Novyi vzgliad publications).
96. See, e.g., Decision No. 5 (42) On Ia. Mogutin's Publication "Chechen Knot. 13
Theses" in the Newspaper "Novyi vzgliad," No. 3, 1995 (Feb. 21, 1995), Ross. GAzETA, Mar.
2, 1995, at 5 [hereinafter Decision No. 42] (noting Judicial Chamber heard testimony from
representatives of Assembly of Chechen People of Russia "For Peace, Accord, and Revival").
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with extensive reference to procedural history (if any),97 governing Russian
constitutional, statutory, presidential, and administrative provisions,98 and
international law norms and rules.' It resolves disputes, prescribes remedies
after considering mitigating and aggravating factors,"° and publishes most
of its opinions."0'
97. See, e.g., Decision No. 35 On the State of Freedom of Mass Information in
Primorskii Krai (Dec. 13, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Dec. 27, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Decision
No. 35] (discussing previous rulings by Judicial Chamber against Primorskii krai authorities).
In some cases, the procedural history is split between the second and third sections. See, e.g.,
Decision No. 15, supra note 93 (noting previous actions against Zavtra by Judicial Chamber,
Press Committee, and Procurator General).
98. Most commonly cited are the Russian Constitution, Law on the Mass Media, and
Presidential Decree No. 2334 of December 31, 1993 On Additional Guarantees for Citi-
zens' Right to Information. See, e.g., Decision No. 1 On Violation of the Right of "Maiak"
Radio Station Journalists to Receive Socially-Significant Information (Feb. 17, 1994), Ross.
GAZETA, Feb. 25, 1994, at 7 (citing rights to receive information provided in Article 4 of
Constitution, Article 39 of Law on the Mass Media, and Articles 3-4 of Presidential Decree
No. 2334). Other cited statutes include the Law on the Status of Deputies, see, e.g., Decision
No. 33, supra note 83, Fundamental Principles on Protection of Citizens' Health, see, e.g.,
Decision No. 43, supra note 83, and Labor Code, see, e.g., Decision No. 5, supra note 90.
99. See, e.g., Decision No. 5, supra note 90 (citing United Nations Convention of
December 18, 1979 "On Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women").
100. See, e.g., Decision No. 2, supra note 90 (taking into consideration intention of
Russian Government Press Service to improve accreditation, notification, and admission of
journalists in future); Decision No. 15, supra note 93 (emphasizing fact that Zavtra "continued
to publish materials that flagrantly violated legal ethical norms" despite prior rulings by
Judicial Chamber, Press Committee, and Procurator General's Office). The Judicial Chamber
also carefully notes any admissions of misconduct by the parties. See, e.g., Decision No. 8
(45) On the Krasnoiarsk Krai Administration's Refusal to Allow Journalists of the "Afontovo"
Television Company Access to an Accident Site (Mar. 23, 1995), Ross. GAzTA, Mar. 31,
1995, at 5 [hereinafter Decision No. 45] (noting official admitted he gave order not to allow
journalists access to airplane crash); Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (noting Ekspress-gazeta
representatives admitted article not true or objective); Decision No. 44, supra note 83 (noting
"readiness of VGRK to correct its admitted mistake" in using inaccurate information regarding
the ownership of "Sirena" corporation).
101. The Judicial Chamber issues opinions in the form of decisions, recommendations,
statements, and expert conclusions. Statute on the Judicial Chamber, supra note 12, arts. 21,
30. Unfortunately, there is no statutory definition of the structure or content of these four
types of opinions. According to the Statute on the Judicial Chamber, as amended, there is
mandatory publication of all recommendations and the "most important decisions" in
Rossiiskaia gazeta. See supra note 12. Occasionally, the Judicial Chamber also orders or
recommends publication of an opinion in a claimant's or defendant's newspaper. See, e.g.,
Decision No. 30, supra note 82 (requiring publication in Sobesednik); Decision No. 37, supra
note 83 (suggesting publication in Poliarnaia pravda and Murmanskii vestnik). In 1995, the
Judicial Chamber published a complete collection of opinions with commentary and docu-
ments. See JUDICIAL CHAMBER COLLECTION, supra note 12.
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Yet, as its opinions reveal, the Judicial Chamber actually performs
an amalgam of functions. It acts as court, Constitutional Court, legisla-
tive body, government agency, prosecutor, and media ethics board."°
Even in its most formal decisions, the Judicial Chamber is not merely an
arbiter of fact and law; it is an engaged and emotional participant in the
process. The Judicial Chamber expresses its views of the parties and their
conduct in strong, often colorful language." It uses a specific case or
controversy as a springboard for a general discussion of legal and moral
principles, rights, and responsibilities." °4 It makes a conscious effort to
guide and educate as well as decide and discipline. 5 Thus, Chairman
Vengerov may have captured the essence of the Judicial Chamber best
when he described it as "unfamiliar, unusual, and somewhat juridicallyexotic. " "
Since its inception, the Judicial Chamber has been widely criticized as
extraconstitutional and ineffective.1' 7 It has even been labeled a successor
to the notorious communist revolutionary tribunals, censorship bodies, and
agitation and propaganda organs.' 8 It is routinely pilloried in the press,
102. See Krug, supra note 74; Nikita Vainonen, Will Things Be Any Easier for the
Reader? The President Is Concerned About the Right to Information, the Premier About
the Newspapers' Survival, Ross. VEsT, Jan. 10, 1994, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Jan. 10, 1994, at 40 (describing judicial, administrative, and legislative powers of Judicial
Chamber). Its very name - Sudebnaia palata po informatsionnym sporam pri Prezidente
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Russian Federation Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes) -
reveals the multifaceted nature and ambiguous position of the Judicial Chamber. Sudebnaia
expresses its role as a court. Palata, however, is a term more commonly associated with
a legislative "chamber" or "house" or governmental "board." "Pri" Prezidente adds to the
confusion further by designating the Judicial Chamber as a body "under" or "attached to" the
president.
103. See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Statement No. 3, supra note 9 ("Freedom of mass information is a neces-
sary condition for democracy .... Freedom of expression is the key to all other human
rights. Therefore, any attempt to restrict it also threatens all remaining rights.").
105. See infra notes 314-27 and accompanying text.
106. A.B. Vengerov, The Judicial Chamber in the Information Space of Russia (Polemi-
cal Notes), in JUDICIAL CHAMBER COLLECTION, supra note 12, at 136, 140.
107. See, e.g., Aleksandr Ababkov, But We Still Live in Poverty Today, Ross. GAZETA,
May 13, 1995, at 6 (describing Judicial Chamber as "illegitimate body" and concluding that
"there is no need for it"); Aleksandr Danilov, Sisyphean Labor, Ross. GAZETA, May 13,
1995, at 6 (labelling Judicial Chamber's work as fruitless "Sisyphean labor" and calling for
"self-dissolution"); Klimov, supra note 12, at 1, 6 (describing Judicial Chamber as ineffective
and unconstitutional). For replies to such charges, see Vengerov, supra note 106, at 140-43;
and Statement No. 4, supra note 80.
108. See, e.g., Batygin, supra note 83, at 29 (accusing Judicial Chamber of "taking on
the 'best' punitive traditions of agitprop"); Klimov, supra note 12, at 6 (analogizing Judicial
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ignored by defendants, and threatened with extinction. 9 Its future is uncer-
tain. Nonetheless, its current contribution is considerable. As the author of
more than one hundred opinions, the Judicial Chamber provides invaluable
insights into evolving post-Soviet approaches to law.
IV. Judicial Chamber Performance: The Harmful Speech Opinions" °
Judicial Chamber opinions paint a dismal picture of a public bombarded
with false, offensive, and dangerous information, yet deprived of even the
Chamber to Stalinist "troika" tribunals); Leonid Nikitinskii, Judicial Chamber for Information
Disputes: Censorship or Promotion of Free Speech?, IzvEsTIIA, Feb. 4, 1994, at 3 (suggesting
Judicial Chamber is "very similar to a censorship organ").
109. For a sampling of media criticism of the Judicial Chamber, see commentaries
published under the general title: Do We Challenge the Judicial Chamber for Information
Disputes?, Ross. GAZErA, May 13, 1995, at 6. See also Anna Politkovskaia, "Vox Populi"
Conquers the Capital, But the Capital Staunchly Resists, OBSHCHAA GAZETA, Mar. 2-8,
1995, at 12, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 20, 1995, at 25 (describing how Novyi vzgliad
editor-in-chief "showered Judicial Chamber with insults" at hearing). Judicial Chamber
opinions often report that defendants refused to attend hearings despite "timely and repeated
invitations," see, e.g., Decision No. 49, supra note 12 (discussing nonappearance by
Rossiiskaia gazeta editor-in-chief and author), and/or failed to comply with earlier Judicial
Chamber rulings, see, e.g., Decision No. 15, supra note 93 ("The Zavtra editorial office
ignored the Judicial Chamber's statement of April 4, 1994 and continued to publish materials
that flagrantly violated legal and ethical norms."). For a discussion of moves to declare the
Judicial Chamber unconstitutional, see Klimov, supra note 12, at 6; and Statement No. 4,
supra note 80.
110. The following description of plots and characters applies to all but one Judicial
Chamber harmful speech opinion published in Rossiiskaia gazeta. The exception is Statement
No. 2, in which the Judicial Chamber upheld Obshchaia gazeta's publication of the so-called
coup "Version No. 1" despite its dubious veracity and potentially inflammatory and
destabilizing effect. Statement No. 2 On Publication in "Obshchaia gazeta" of the So-called
"Version No. 1" (Apr. 4, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, Apr. 9, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Statement
No. 2]. The Judicial Chamber emphasized the fact that the newspaper explicitly stated in
writing that it could not vouch for the reliability of the report. Id. Most importantly, the
Judicial Chamber decided that publication actually "defused the political atmosphere," noting
that "[wlorld history has known of cases when a leak of information has prevented state
upheaval, but disregard of information has led to tragedy." Id. Another arguably anomalous
case is Decision No. 44, in which the Judicial Chamber, on a similar rationale, ruled that a
television expos6 of fascism in Russia did not constitute harmful speech because it "alarmed
the public and became grounds for urging authorities to take action." Decision No. 44, supra
note 83. Nonetheless, the Judicial Chamber did not allow the authors to emerge unscathed.
It reprimanded them for "insufficiently verified and inaccurate information." Id. It should
also be noted that the Judicial Chamber's "official interference" cases, which are not the
subject of this article, present a far more sympathetic view of the media. These opinions
depict journalists and publishers as public-spirited crusaders for the truth, blocked at every
turn by state personnel and bodies. For a description of the entire body of Judicial Chamber
opinions, see generally Foster, supra note 80.
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most basic facts about its government's policies and actions. These cases
cover a wide range of topics, from media dissemination of ethnic slurs to
seductive cigarette advertisements. Despite the significant variation in
content, there are marked continuities in the Judicial Chamber's depiction of
the characters, issues, values, and legal principles involved. Thus, these
cases provide a useful vehicle for studying the message the Judicial Chamber
conveys to the reader about legal norms and discourse in post-Soviet Russia.
A. The Plots..
More than two-thirds of its published opinions concern publications and
broadcasts that the Judicial Chamber deems harmful for Russian society.
There are six recurrent plots. The first and most prevalent involves media
dissemination of information that "incites" ethnic, social, and religious
"intolerance," "hatred," or "tension."11 2 The prototypical case is Decision
No. 42, an examination initiated by the Judicial Chamber of Ia. Mogutin's
controversial Novyi vzgliad article "Chechen Knot. 13 Theses. 113  The
article rejected the official account of the ongoing conflict in Chechnia as a
Russian military effort to defeat armed rebellion by Chechen separatists and
restore constitutional order in a Russian Federation Republic." 4 The author
argued instead that the Chechen war was the natural result of "ethnic incom-
patibility" and "zoological," "genetic" animosity of superior, Christian
Russians for inferior, Moslem Chechens."' He claimed that Chechens were
"semi-savage," were famous "only for their barbarism and sullen anger,"
and "had made absolutely no contribution to the world other than interna-
tional terrorism and the drug trade." 6 Mogutin attacked opponents of his
views. He "insulted" religious leaders, castigated intellectuals for their
"anti-Russian" and "unpatriotic attitudes," and accused "democrats" of
"wanting to shrink the borders of the Russia they hate. " '7
111. The inspiration for this structure is Moran, supra note 71, at 1430-34, 1438-51,
1484-85, 1486-93. Like Moran, I describe the "plots" and "characters" of Judicial Chamber
opinions. Moran focuses on "the state" and "the speaker" of U.S. and Canadian hate speech
cases. I identify several additional characters in the Russian context.
112. See, e.g., Decision No. 6, supra note 90.




117. Id. The Judicial Chamber held that Mogutin's article violated the Constitution, Law
on the Mass Media, and ethical norms. It sent its decision to the Russian Press Committee
(the registering body) with instructions to suspend or terminate Novyi vzgliad and to the
procurator's office to determine whether or not to press criminal charges.
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A central theme in recent opinions is media dissemination of fascist and
anti-Semitic materials.118 In the words of the Judicial Chamber, it "has
addressed this subject often. ' 19 For instance, in January 1995, the Judicial
Chamber made a special expert assessment of publications in the Volgograd
newspaper Kolokol as "abuses of freedom of mass information." ' Kolokol
articles blamed Russia's current ills on "purposeful destruction by Zionist
groups of the West and a fifth column of Zionists in Russia," characterized
Jews as enemies of the Russian people who controlled "all key positions in
Russia," and even "tested" the family names of local leaders for possible
Jewish origins. 1
21
The second major plot concerns media dissemination of information that
"discredits"1" state institutions, personnel, and legislation. The Judicial
Chamber has examined and censured publications and broadcasts ridiculing
the federal legislature as a "farce" and its deputies as "clowns" and "buf-
foons. "" It has denounced materials accusing government officials of
corruption, abuse of power, and falsification of educational and military
credentials.U President Yeltsin has also figured prominently in Judicial'
Chamber opinions. Indeed, in April 1994, the Judicial Chamber was moved
to issue a special statement condemning a Zavtra journalist for attempting to
"discredit, diminish, and injure the Russian Federation president with
profoundly immoral and malicious speculations on the subject of his health
in an effort.., to introduce into the public consciousness the impression
that the chief of state is an incapable and incapacitated politician." '2
118. See, e.g., Decision No. 44, supra note 83.
119. Id.
120. Expert Conclusion No. 5 On the Legal Assessment of Publications in the Newspaper
"Kolokol" (Volgograd) in 1994 (Jan. 20, 1995), Ross. GAZerA, Feb. 2, 1995, at 15 [hereinaf-
ter Expert Conclusion No. 5].
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Decision No. 20 (57) On the Appeal by State Duma Deputy Chairman A.
Chilingarov Regarding Publication of "Should the Icebergs Be Sold?" in "Moskovskaia
pravda" on June 16, 1995 (July 13, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, July 28, 1995, at 5 [hereinafter
Decision No. 57] (upholding claim that publication "discredits" Duma Vice Chairman's
political, social, and professional reputation and "authority of legislative power").
123. Decision No. 50, supra note 90.
124. See, e.g., Decision No. 43, supra note 83 (reporting accusations that drafters of
advertising law were trying to "line their own pockets"); Decision No. 48, supra note 82
(noting Izvestiia article claiming official falsified credentials); Decision No. 49, supra note 12
(regarding Rossiiskaia gazeta article contending Press Committee abused control over
subsidies).
125. Statement No. 1 On I. Andronov's Publication in "Zavtra" (Apr. 4, 1994), Ross.
GAZMA, Apr. 13, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Statement No. 1].
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In addition, the Judicial Chamber has focused on another form of
information that subverts the Russian political process - "improper" media
coverage of election campaigns. It has identified several negative media
practices. These include "premature"'26 dissemination of election campaign
literature and speeches; publication and broadcasts of offensive, slanderous,
and inflammatory statements by candidates; incomplete, unreliable, and
unobjective commentary; and "clear political preferences" and support for
candidates that go "beyond the bounds of the permissible."127
Judicial Chamber decisions also deal with materials that "disparage"12
Russian legislation. The most notable of these is Decision No. 43, an action
brought against several central Moscow newspapers for their "inaccurate,"
"tendentious," and "unobjective" critiques of the draft advertising law.'29
The Judicial Chamber supported the claimant's contention that these articles
discredited individual statutory provisions and their conceptual basis, insulted
the drafters, and undermined public support for enactment of the law13°
The third plot involves media dissemination of information that discrim-
inates on the basis of gender. Rossliskaia gazeta has published two key
Judicial Chamber decisions on the topic, Decision No. 5 and Decision No.
30. The first case declared unconstitutional newspaper publication of adver-
tisements for job openings limited to male applicants only.' The second
case dealt with a very different type of discriminatory publication - articles
that targeted female legislators for "disrespect" and "humiliation. 132 At
issue were two Sobesednik articles that allegedly insulted and discredited the
professional activity of female deputies through the use of sexual innuendo
and other "inappropriate" methods.133 For example, one article contended
126. Decision No. 21 (58) On the Appeal by Moscow Oblast' Duma Deputy R. Ia.
Murashkovskaia Regarding the Legality of the "Kiln Television" TOO's Activity in Preparing
and Disseminating Information that was Preelectoral in Nature (July 13, 1995), Ross.
GAZETA, July 20, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Decision No. 58].
127. Statement No. 3 (14) On Several Cases Involving Violation of Election Cam-
paign Rules (Dec. 9, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, Dec. 14, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Statement No.
14].
128. See, e.g., Decision No. 50, supra note 90.
129. Decision No. 43, supra note 83.
130. Id.
131. Decision No. 5, supra note 90.
132. Decision No. 30, supra note 82, at 4, 4. The Judicial Chamber issued an earlier
decision, which was not published in Rossliskala gazeta, condemning one of these Sobesednik
articles. See Decision No. 18 On the Publication in the Weekly "Sobesednik" No. 17 (1994)
of "Women in Russia: Abstinence Until Victory" (June 15, 1994), in JUDICIAL CHAMBER
COLLECTION, supra note 12, at 49.
133. Decision No. 30, supra note 82.
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that the "Women of Russia" parliamentary faction had called upon Russian
women to withhold sex from "their husbands and boyfriends until order is
restored in Russia."'34 Another article's title asked "How Much is the Honor
of 22 Female State Duma Deputies Worth?'
135
The fourth recurrent plot concerns information that undermines pub-
lic morality. A prime illustration is Decision No. 7, the Judicial Chamber's
determination that several Novyi vzgliad articles constituted a threat to the
moral interests of Russian children and adolescents. 136 Novyi vzgliad had
published grotesque accounts of "pathological" criminal and sexual "perver-
sions" under such provocative titles as "Cannibal-Lover," "Breasts in a
Pastry," and "Serial Murders. "37 Because of lax distribution policies, Novyi
vzgliad apparently had reached the tender eyes of Russian adolescents and
had become a topic of wide discussion among schoolchildren.
3 1
In a similar vein, a much-publicized recent decision ruled that the "Wild
Field" television program "disseminat[ed] ... information [that] weakens
moral principles and has the potential to cause moral injury and destroy
family relations."' 39 The broadcast, an expos6 of allegedly rampant lesbian-
ism in Russian prisons, contained close-up shots of women prisoners who
had not consented to being filmed.
The fifth plot concerns media dissemination of information that causes
physical harm. The best example is Recommendation No. 1, issued by the
Judicial Chamber in May 1994.'0 This opinion, entitled "On Advertise-
ments Disseminated by the Mass Media that are Hazardous to Life and
Health," provided a critical analysis of newspaper and television advertise-
ments that encourage public consumption of alcoholic beverages and tobacco
products. It also denounced media advertising and "propagandizing" of
unapproved medicinal remedies and uncertified practitioners of "nontradi-
tional methods of treatment." 41 Recent opinions suggest that advertisement
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Decision No. 7, supra note 91.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Decision No. 32 (69) On Violations in A.G. Nevzorov's June 30, 1995 "Wild Field"
Program of the Constitutional Rights of Convicts Imprisoned in Institution US-20/2 (Oct. 19,
1995), Ross. GAzETA, Oct. 31, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Decision No. 69].
140. Recommendation No. 1 On Advertisements Disseminated by the Mass Media that
are Hazardous to Life and Health (May 5, 1994), Ross. GAZETA, May 14, 1994, at 4
[hereinafter Recommendation No. 1].
141. Id.
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of "unhealthful" products remains a serious problem despite stiff new legal
prohibitions against it."'
The sixth and final plot concerns information that causes financial harm
to citizens. The key case is Decision No. 16, the Judicial Chamber's ruling
against the allegedly fraudulent, illegal, and unlicensed television lottery
Game "05.'' 43 One of the founders, a television journalist, advertised the
lottery on his Sunday television program. Game "05" organizers promised
TV viewers large sums of money for telephoning in the correct answers to
"relatively simple questions. "44 They neglected to mention, however, the
expense of each telephone call. As a result, most callers received for their
efforts the taped message "your number has not been chosen by the com-
puter" and a high telephone bill.4 In all, the Moscow telephone company
sent out 600 million rubles worth of bills to Game "05" participants.'
4
Several subsequent Judicial Chamber opinions have only confirmed the
threat of "unscrupulous," "misleading," and "concealed" advertisements to
Russian consumers. 47 For example, in a June 1995 decision, 148 the Judicial
Chamber targeted the "deceptive" and "unfair" practices of the Federal
Investment Fund for Social Protection. Even though it was a purely com-
mercial entity, the Fund had included in its television advertisements shots
of Russian legislative buildings, sessions, and chairman as well as pictures
of the state flag and state emblem. According to the Judicial Chamber, the
goal was to lure potential investors with the false promise that the Fund was
142. See Decision No. 14 (51) On the Appeals by the Newspaper "Vecherniaia Ufa's"
Editorial Board and Editor-in-Chief Ia. B. Khusainov Regarding the Legality of Advertise-
ments Published in the Newspaper (May 25, 1995), Ross. GAzETA, June 1, 1995, at 6
[hereinafter Decision No. 51].
143. Decision No. 16, supra note 90, at 3, 3. Rossiiskaia gazeta published an abridged
version of this decision. See Decision No. 16 On Violations of Legal and Ethical Norms in
Conducting the Paid Game "05" with the Use of the Mass Media (June 2, 1994), in JUDICIAL
CHAMBER COLLECTION, supra note 12, at 45 (providing complete text).
144. Tamara Ivanova, Russian Judicial Chamber Rules TV Show to Be Illegal (ITAR-
TASS broadcast, June 2, 1994).
145. Id.
146. Id. As a result of the Judicial Chamber decision, 140 million rubles were restored
to citizens. See Vengerov, supra note 106, at 3.
147. See, e.g., Decision No. 51, supra note 142; Recommendations of the Russian
Federation Presidential Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes and the Union of Russian
Journalists On the Freedom of Mass Information and the Responsibility of Journalists (June
15, 1995), Ross. GAZETA, July 11, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Joint Recommendations].
148. Decision No. 17 (54) On the Appeal by the Chairman of the Committee for Organi-
zation of the State Duma's Work, V.A. Bauer, Regarding Federal Investment Fund Advertise-
ments in the Mass Media (June 29, 1995), Ross. GAZEA, July 5, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter
Decision No. 54].
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a state organization, backed by the full faith and credit of the Russian legisla-
ture.
B. The Characters
Judicial Chamber opinions feature a large and varied cast of characters.
Those with recurring roles are society, the speaker, the publisher, the
audience, the target, the state, and, of course, the Judicial Chamber itself.
1. Society
The dominant image in Judicial Chamber opinions is that of a fragile
post-Soviet "democratic" society and reform process. Their fate hangs by
a thread. "Irresponsible"'49 journalism threatens to rend the moral fabric of
society and destroy the already tenuous credibility and legitimacy of Russia's
"young institutions of statehood."'5 Conditions are so precarious that even
the most minor media deviation from legal or ethical principles could trigger
a "social explosion"'' and plunge Russia into anarchy, chauvinism, and
immorality.
Judicial Chamber rhetoric underscores the gravity and sensitivity of the
situation. The watchword of Judicial Chamber opinions is "danger." Dis-
semination of "extremist views" poses a "high degree of social danger." 5
Fascism is a "real social danger."" Seductive advertisements for cigarettes
and alcoholic beverages are "dangerous for life and health." 54 Dramatic
adjectives, such as "serious," "alarming," "destructive," "provocative," and
"pernicious," reinforce this view of a Russian society in peril.155 Use of
superlatives and modifying adverbs only heightens the sense of urgency. For
example, one opinion described publications "fraught with the most ruinous
consequences."' 56 Another condemned an author's "sharply destructive
position.."5
149. See, e.g., Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
150. See, e.g., Decision No. 50, supra note 90.
151. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
152. Decision No. 44, supra note 83.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140.
155. See Decision No. 32, supra note 93 ("serious"); Recommendation No. 1, supra note
140 ("alarming"); Statement No. 1, supra note 125 ("destructive"); Decision No. 42, supra
note 96 ("provocative"); Joint Recommendations, supra note 147 ("pernicious").
156. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
157. Statement No. 1, supra note 125.
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References to warfare pervade Judicial Chamber opinions. "Aggres-
sive" "enemies" menace Russian society. s Publications "propagandize war,"
incite paramilitary armed groups, and provide recipes for Molotov cocktails
and other weapons." 9 The Judicial Chamber proposes new or improved
legislation in the "battle" against fascism and abuses of the mass media."6°
Words of balance and weight convey the impression of a Russian soci-
ety poised on the brink of disaster. The Judicial Chamber has called upon
journalists to "weigh every word"'' and has warned of the dangers of even
the "slightest imbalance" in analysis of interethnic conflicts. 6 2 In its joint
recommendations with the Union of Russian Journalists, the Judicial Cham-
ber made its most extensive use of the metaphor yet. It proclaimed that
media coverage of interethnic relations and interactions between federal and
local authorities "must be carefully weighed on pharmacist's scales since a
mistake in the dosage can make a publication a poison rather than a medi-
cine. t"163
2. The Speaker
The speaker, be it journalist, advertiser, or editorial staff, is generally
the principal villain of the piece. In the most dramatic Judicial Chamber
opinions, the speaker has deliberately set out to destroy the Russian state and
incite social and ethnic discord. These opinions emphasize the fundamen-
tally evil character of the speaker and his message. They also highlight the
intentional nature of the act. Words such as "deliberately," "knowingly,"
and "intentionally" appear often.'" At the same time, the Judicial Chamber
attempts to isolate the speaker and undercut the credibility of the message.
It does so by depicting the speaker as mentally unbalanced and the message
as "extremist" or "absurd." 65
158. See, e.g., Decision No. 21, supra note 83; Expert Conclusion No. 5, supra note
120.
159. See, e.g., Decision No. 15, supra note 93; Decision No. 21, supra note 83.
160. See, e.g., Decision No. 21, supra note 83 (noting "battle against abuse of freedom
of mass information"); Decision No. 44, supra note 83 (recognizing "battle against fascism").
161. Statement No. 11 On Defense of Freedom of Mass Information in Connection with
the Events in Chechnia (Dec. 26, 1994), Ross. GAzETA, Dec. 30, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter
Statement No. 11].
162. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
163. Id.
164. Decision No. 42, supra note 96.
165. See, e.g., id. (describing author's "delirious fabrications" and arguing that author
took notion of enmity between Chechens and Russians "to the point of absurdity"); Decision
No. 11, supra note 83 (describing "absurd suppositions" in Ekspress-gazeta publication);
Decision No. 21, supra note 83 (characterizing as "extremist" positions of Zavtra author).
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Other Judicial Chamber opinions paint the speaker as unscrupulous and
duplicitous. These cases involve journalists or advertisers who take advan-
tage of public naivet6 and glitches in the Russian legislative and government
system for financial, reputational, or political self-aggrandizement.16 These
speakers "do not spurn the basest methods"'67 to sell their stories, schemes,
and products. Their stock in trade is deception. The Judicial Chamber
brings this point home by providing a detailed list of "tricks"'6 employed by
journalists and advertisers. These include falsification of data, deliberate
omission or misstatement of unsupportive facts, use of quotations out of
context, reference to "worthless" sociological polls, and hidden advertise-
ments. 1
69
Another concern of Judicial Chamber opinions is the disrespectful
attitude of Russian speakers toward state organs and personnel. Speakers
repeatedly "slander," "libel," "mock," "deride," and "maliciously insult"
even the highest leaders and government bodies.17 Moreover, as a June
1995 decision revealed, advertisers do not hesitate to appropriate the most
sacred symbols of Russian statehood to hock their wares.
171
In a number of opinions, speakers appear as sloppy and inexperienced.
They fail to verify facts and rumors,'" make numerous mistakes in their
166. See, e.g., Decision No. 16, supra note 90 (involving advertisement of lottery by
journalist); Decision No. 58, supra note 126 (regarding broadcast of political messages to
encourage viewers to vote for television company director); Statement No. 1, supra note 125
(castigating author for inventing stories for self promotion); Joint Recommendations, supra
note 147 (criticizing journalists for publications "concocted for ratings" or intended "to inflate
authority or to discredit political rivals").
167. Statement No. 1, supra note 125.
168. Decision No. 49, supra note 12.
169. See Decision No. 30, supra note 82 (noting "worthless sociological poll"); see also
Decision No. 48, supra note 82 (discussing fabricated biography); Decision No. 43, supra
note 83 (citing deliberate misstatements and omissions regarding draft advertising law);
Decision No. 49, supra note 12 (noting author "concealed" fact that she used 1995 statistics
to support allegation of misuse of subsidies by Press Committee in 1994); Decision No. 51,
supra note 142 (regarding hidden advertisement); Statement No. 1, supra note 125 (consider-
ing use of quotations out of context).
170. See, e.g., Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (stating Ekspress-gazeta article "libels,"
"mocks," "humiliates," and "derides" Duma deputies); Decision No. 50, supra note 90
(stating Segodnia article insulted Duma deputies and voters and disparaged legislation).
171. Decision No. 54, supra note 148 (stating Federal Investment Fund advertisements
included shots of seats of federal legislative, executive, and presidential power, and pictures
of Russian Federation state flag and state emblem in attempt "to create in citizens the notion
that a commercial organization - the Fund - was a state organization and, what is more,
acting under the aegis of the State Duma").
172. See, e.g., Decision No. 49, supra note 12 (noting author failed to verify facts
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reporting of legal texts and issues and use of legal terminology, 73 write in
a "crude," "unidimensional and primitive fashion"174 about complex social
and political problems, and are "elementarily ignorant and mistaken.
17 5
Even a rare Judicial Chamber harmful speech ruling in favor of journalists,
Decision No. 44, criticized authors of the television expos6 "Newspaper
Histories" ("Fascism in Russia. Who?") for their "use of insufficiently
verified and inaccurate information."
17 6
Thus, the speaker emerges in Judicial Chamber harmful speech deci-
sions as a "negative"" influence on Russian society and democratic reform
process. Whether by accident or design, authors of harmful materials
repeatedly violate professional ethics, moral principles, and citizens' legal
rights, interests, honor, and dignity. They insist on "unbridled"178 freedom
of speech but are "insufficiently responsible about the possible conse-
quences. 17 9  In the final analysis, the speaker is a figure that deserves
minimal protection and respect.
3. The Publisher
The Judicial Chamber reserves its harshest invective for the publisher
of harmful materials. In some cases, it characterizes publishers as open and
dedicated enemies of Russia. It uses the strongest possible language to
condemn newspapers such as Zavtra, Novyi vzgliad, and A'-Kods for
inciting social and national hatred, discrediting Russian officials and institu-
tions, and undermining public morality.1" The Judicial Chamber has spoken
of full-scale campaigns by some mass media organs to destroy Russia's polit-
ical and social establishments,' including "all-out persecution of prominent
through official interview or meeting with Press Committee leaders).
173. See, e.g., Decision No. 30, supra note 82 (declaring that Sobesednik articles on
Women of Russia faction included comments that were "full of errors" on several legal
issues); Decision No. 43, supra note 83 (stating that articles on draft advertising law contained
"unreliable information about the text of the draft law and individual provisions" and "used
legal terms improperly").
174. Decision No. 42, supra note 96.
175. Decision No. 11, supra note 83.
176. Decision No. 44, supra note 83.
177. Decision No. 21, supra note 83.
178. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
179. Decision No. 6, supra note 90.
180. See, e.g., Decision No. 7, supra note 91 (ruling against Novyi vzgliad); Decision
No. 21, supra note 83 (condemning newspapers, including Zavtra and A-Kods, that incite
social and nationalist intolerance).
181. Expert Conclusion No. 5, supra note 120.
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politicians and officials.""2 It has attacked publishers of this ilk for using
fraudulent means to obtain registration certificates, " ignoring legal and
administrative publication procedures,8" and persisting in their "dangerous,"
"impermissible" activity despite warnings from the Judicial Chamber and law
enforcement organs.s According to the Judicial Chamber, these publishers
"flagrantly" 86 "flout"187 Russian legal and ethical norms, yet remain unre-
pentant and intransigent. They are beyond appeal to reason or conscience.'
88
In other cases, the Judicial Chamber focuses on publishers that place
profit motive ahead of legal and ethical duties. In these opinions, publishers
deliberately "distort" information for "sensation" and "popularity.' 89 They
disseminate remunerative advertisements that are illegal, dangerous, decep-
tive, and libelous' 9° and allow major advertisers to control the content of
publications and programming. 9' Such publishers make no attempt to
supply morally uplifting materials, but instead cater to the basest tastes of
their audience."9 Moreover, they routinely exploit loopholes in the law and
inadequate law enforcement for financial gain.' 93
182. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
183. See, e.g., Decision No. 42, supra note 96; Expert Conclusion No. 5, supra note 120.
184. See, e.g., Decision No. 21, supra note 83.
185. See, e.g., Decision No. 15, supra note 93 (Zatrwa ignored warnings from Press Com-
mittee and Judicial Chamber).
186. Decision No. 5, supra note 90.
187. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
188. See Statement No. 1, supra note 125 ("The Judicial Chamber realizes that, of course,
it is futile to reason with or appeal to the conscience of editorial offices of newspapers of the
'spiritual opposition'").
189. See id. (claiming author fabricated stories for "publicity" purposes); Joint Recommen-
dations, supra note 147 ("Even reputable publishers commit violations with unverified reports
and deliberate distortion of factual material for the sake of sensational presentation. They do so
by hushing up unprofitable facts and overemphasizing sensational facts.").
190. See, e.g., Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140 (noting "hazardous" advertisements
for cigarettes, alcohol, and unlicensed medical treatments); Decision No. 5, supra note 90 (noting
illegal advertisements for job openings limited by gender); Decision No. 51, supra note 142
(uncovering "hidden" advertisements that "disinformed" readers about activities of Bashkir
Special Commodities-Raw Materials Exchange); Decision No. 54, supra note 148 (reporting
"deceptive" advertisements for Federal Investment Fund).
191. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147 (stating advertisements are so lucrative that
"they have begun to dictate the subject matter of publications in many cases").
192. Id.
193. See Statement No. 1, supra note 125 (regarding media "taking advantage of fact that
government press services do not always cover in a timely fashion the work and state of health
of Russia's highest government officials and do not promptly refute various instructions in these
areas"); Joint Recommendations, supra note 147 (stating "many publications 'skillfully' exploit
legislative norm regarding the right not to disclose sources of information").
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A constant theme in Judicial Chamber opinions is the irresponsibility of
Russian publishers. They make little effort to verify published information
or to supervise employees."' They disseminate harmful materials and "pay
no regard to the pernicious effect on the morality of society""95 or stability
of the Russian state. When called to account for their actions, publishers
either deny responsibility altogether or attempt to shift liability to authors or
subsidiary units. In several cases, publishers proffer disingenuous excuses
for their actions. They plead poverty, ignorance, youth, and the inexorable
demands of capitalist competition." They frequently refuse to participate
in Judicial Chamber sessions or they provide evasive, unconvincing answers
and explanations. 98
Finally, publishers appear as "unprincipled and inconsistent""' hypo-
crites. Mass media organs "speak endlessly about human rights [but] with
ease and extraordinary irresponsibility trample on these rights. '" They laud
glasnost' and citizens' constitutional right to receive information yet "avoid
194. See Decision No. 5, supra note 90 (stating publishers need to verify that published
advertisements conform with Constitution and legislative acts); Decision No. 16, supra note 90
(recommending mass media editorial offices and television companies take measures to prevent
abuses by journalists of professional status to advertise "ethically questionable and illegal"
commercial projects); Decision No. 43, supra note 83 (admonishing publishers "to be more
careful in verifying facts and information in the preparation and publication of materials that
evaluate drafts of normative, legal acts").
195. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
196. See, e.g., Decision No. 5, supra note 90 (involving E!onomika i zhizn" editorial office
disclaiming responsibility for content of discriminatory advertisement); Decision No. 50, supra
note 90 (regarding Segodnia editor-in-chief denying responsibility for article published in so-
called "author's column"); Decision No. 42, supra note 96 (considering Novyi vzgliad editor-in-
chief attempting to relieve himself of liability by stating article was "just one point of view" and
"evidence of pluralism"); Joint Recommendations, supra note 147 (noting that "heads of many
mass media organs arbitrarily expand [the] category" of publications for which they are not liable
"to include author's columns, special pages, and individual contributions... [and] shift liability
for the content to authors personally or to subsidiary editorial offices").
197. See, e.g., Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (involving Ekspress-gazeta representatives
defending publication of sensational, inaccurate, and insulting story about State Duma on grounds
that their newspaper was "young" and had to "get on its feet" and "defeat its rivals"); Recom-
mendation No. 1, supra note 140 (discussing media justifying dissemination of dangerous
advertisements due to "financial hardship"); Decision No. 58, supra note 126 (discussing
television channel director pleading ignorance of electoral requirements for pre-election agita-
tion).
198. See Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (stating Ekspress-gazeta editor-in-chief "deliber-
ately and without valid reasons refused to participate in the [Judicial Chamber] hearing");
Decision No. 49, supra note 12 (noting Rossiiskaia gazeta editor-in-chief provided "groundless"
excuses to avoid participation in hearing and delay examination of case).
199. Decision No. 57, supra note 122.
200. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
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open and public discussion" and substantiation of their own "untruthful and
unobjective" stories."°  Worst of all, mass media organs complain of "diktat
of authorities" at the very same time that they themselves are attempting to
establish "diktat of the press."M
4. The Audience
In sharp contrast is the Judicial Chamber depiction of the media audi-
ence. Russian readers, viewers, and listeners are sympathetic but pitiable
characters. They are naive and gullible, easily defrauded and duped by
unscrupulous journalists, advertisers, politicians, and publishers. 3 They are
undiscriminating consumers of information, unable to distinguish fact from
fiction or beneficial from harmful information.' Their tastes are crude and
unsophisticated. They have an insatiable appetite for scandal, sensation,
hyperbole, pornography, and perversion.'
In Judicial Chamber opinions, the audience is not an independent actor
but a passive victim of outside forces. It is susceptible to any external
influence, including those that seek to exacerbate ethnic, social, and relig-
ious divisions and to undermine public confidence in democratic institu-
tions, officials, and legislation.' Judicial Chamber language conveys this
sense of passivity. Several opinions describe the audience as "led astray,"
"deceived," or "disinformed" by a speaker or publisher. 7 Others refer to
attempts to "introduce into the public consciousness '"" a certain idea, to
"cause '209 readers to have a negative attitude, impression, or stereotype,
201. See Decision No. 57, supra note 122.
202. Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
203. See Decision No. 16, supra note 90 (noting television viewers defrauded by lottery).
204. See Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140 (noting adverse impact on public of
"dangerous" advertisements).
205. See Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
206. See Decision No. 21, supra note 83 (describing destabilizing effect of racist,
extremist, and "unobjective" information as well as "crude and unsubstantiated attacks"
against Russian President, Government, and other "institutions of Russian statehood").
207. Decision No. 54, supra note 148 ("led astray"); Decision No. 51, supra note 142
(stating that hidden advertisements "promoted the communication of disinformation to
readers"); Decision No. 58, supra note 126 (discussing possible disinformation and deception
of voters by Klin television's dissemination of political speeches).
208. Statement No. 1, supra note 125; see also Decision No. 54, supra note 148 (stating
that Federal Investment Fund advertising campaign was "designed to create in citizens the
notion that a commercial organization ... was a state organization").
209. Decision No. 43, supra note 83; see also Expert Conclusion No. 5, supra note 120
(claiming Kolokol's anti-Semitic publications could "create a corresponding ethnic negativism
in readers").
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or to "create insufficient public support"21° for specific officials or legisla-
tion.
This depiction of the naive, credulous audience has important implica-
tions for Judicial Chamber treatment of harmful speech. It suggests the need
for some sort of preliminary filter or protective device (whether it is media
self-restraint, moral codes, or government supervision) to ensure dissemina-
tion of only information that benefits Russian audience and, ultimately,
society.
5. The Target
The target of harmful speech appears in two guises - as complainant
and as "absence."2" Several Judicial Chamber decisions involve claims by
government or legislative personnel or groups that were allegedly defamed,
humiliated, and discredited by mass media publications or broadcasts.212 In
these opinions, the target is in the foreground, the initial impetus and focus
of Judicial Chamber attention. The target is important, however, not as an
individual but as the personification of his/her office. In each of these cases,
the sole concern of the Judicial Chamber is the injury to state and society
rather than individual. For example, in April 1995, the Judicial Chamber
ruled that Rossiiskaia gazeta's article "The Thief's Hat is on Fire," which
accused Press Committee Chairman S.P. Gryzunov and his organization of
illegal use of subsidies and budgetary funds, constituted "an abuse of the
mass media and violation of legal and ethical norms."213 The Judicial Cham-
ber defined the injury as "discredit[ing Gryzunov] as a leader of the federal
administration," "undermin[ing] the professional reputation of a government
institution," and "infring[ing] the rights and legal interests of citizens,
especially the receipt of reliable information of social significance."214
In other opinions, the target is strikingly absent from the text. Numer-
ous cases deal with mass media dissemination of hate speech, especially
ethnic slurs.215 Yet, there is no discussion of the actual or potential effect of
such materials on the target groups or their members. Instead, the focus is
210. Decision No. 43, supra note 83.
211. I borrow this term from Binder, supra note 49, at 287 (describing contrasting views
of women in rape cases as "absence" and "prosecutrix").
212. See, e.g., Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (noting claim from Legal Department of
State Duma); Decision No. 43, supra note 83 (noting claim from Deputy Chairman of Russian
Federation State Committee on Antimonopoly Policy and Support of New Economic Struc-
tures).
213. Decision No. 49, supra note 12.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Decision 21, supra note 83; Decision No. 42, supra note 96.
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exclusively on the societal implications. To the Judicial Chamber, the harm
of hate speech is that it undermines government efforts to "normalize tragic
interethnic conflict,"216 foments ethnic discord and intolerance,217 and deep-
ens societal cleavages. 8
Thus, the target emerges in Judicial Chamber opinions as, at best, a
minor character. The real victim is society. The combined portrayal of
target as "complainant" and "absence" only reinforces the Judicial Cham-
ber's construction of harmful speech as nothing less than a serious threat to
Russia's future.
6. The State
In the abstract, the state is idealized and sanctified. The Judicial Cham-
ber speaks in respectful tones of the "institutions of Russian statehood" '219 and
exalts Russian legislators as "the people's representatives. "' It proclaims
the "federal organs of power" (defined in capital letters as Russian Federa-
tion President, State Duma, and Government)?' off limits to media ridicule,
humiliation, and attack. It is appalled by a commercial advertiser's irrever-
ent use of "state symbols and attributes. "222
At a more immediate level, however, a very different picture of the
Russian state emerges. The Judicial Chamber portrays actual legislative,
administrative, judicial, and presidential personnel and bodies as inept,
inexperienced, and overburdened. They appear fundamentally incapable of
meeting the challenge of harmful speech.
Several Judicial Chamber opinions emphasize the failure of Russia's
parliament to create an adequate legislative "base" to battle mass media
abuses. They highlight significant gaps in such areas as dissemination of
fascist materials, production of "dangerous" advertisements, and departures
from registration certificates and broadcast licenses. 23 Despite these glaring
deficiencies in the lawmaking process, some legislators and legislative
committees are unwilling to tolerate constructive criticism of their efforts.
216. Decision No. 6, supra note. 90.
217. See Decision No. 21, supra note 83.
218. See Decision No. 42, supra note 96.
219. See Decision No. 50, supra note 90.
220. Decision No. 11, supra note 83.
221. See Decision No. 54, supra note 148.
222. Id.
223. See Decision No. 44, supra note 83 (noting need for new legislation against
fascism); Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140 (noting gaps in advertising regulations);
Decision No. 21, supra note 83 (noting deficiencies in registration procedures and legislation
to prevent abuse of mass media).
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For example, the State Duma's Committee on Information Policy responded
to Judicial Chamber "critical assessments" of its mass media-related drafts
with an angry, public denunciation of the Judicial Chamber as "extraconsti-
tutional. ,,224
The Judicial Chamber depicts the state as equally ineffective in enforc-
ing the minimal law that does exist. Several opinions cite in particular the
"insufficient control"' of the mass media by government registration and
procuratorial bodies. In Judicial Chamber opinions, state organs command
little respect from the mass media. Publishers and authors of harmful
materials act with impunity, ignoring official warnings from law enforcement
authorities.' To compound the problem, Russia's court system is clogged
with citizens' libel and slander suits against the media.2
Finally, Judicial Chamber opinions suggest that the state, in fact,
contributes to the harmful speech problem. It does so by "covering up
'fn
information and denying journalists access to government meetings and
personnel. The Judicial Chamber identifies as especially egregious in this
regard the conduct of administrative and presidential agencies; these bodies
are "more closed than former party committees. "' In the end, this inacces-
sibility of government disserves Russian state and society. It discourages
proper verification of sources and leads to publication of unreliable, incom-
plete, and inaccurate information, bribery of officials, and outright "fabrica-
tion and conjecture." 0
C. Judicial Chamber Self-Definition
Thus, Judicial Chamber harmful speech opinions portray a country out
of control, fast approaching social explosion and anarchy. With its gullible
public, irresponsible media, and impotent state, Russia appears headed
inevitably to its doom. Only immediate and decisive intervention can
reverse this course. Since Russian leaders and official institutions are unable
to perform this critical function, the Judicial Chamber must step into the
brink as Russia's last hope. This notion of "compelled performance"'' 1 is the
basis for Judicial Chamber self-definition and authority.
224. See Statement No. 4, supra note 80.
225. Decision No. 21, supra note 83.
226. See Expert Conclusion No. 5, supra note 120.




231. Ferguson, supra note 30, at 206.
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1. Compelled Performance
The Judicial Chamber portrays itself first and foremost as a reactive
institution, one that is set into motion only in response to some external
stimulus. It underscores this point by beginning each opinion with direct
reference to a specific triggering agent, event, or circumstance. In most
cases, it cites a formal complaint or appeal from a named individual, legisla-
tive body, or government agency." Even where the Judicial Chamber itself
initiated the opinion, it takes care to identify some outside impetus. For
example, in its statement approving Obshchaia gazeta's publication of a
fictitious coup plot, it opened with a description of widespread public con-
cern and pleas for the Judicial Chamber "to express its attitude" toward the
publication and to clarify "whether this case represented an exercise of
freedom of speech or, on the contrary, an abuse of freedom of mass informa-
tion. u.233
Although the Judicial Chamber often refers to relevant Russian legisla-
tion, it defines its rulings and remedies (especially those that are most
controversial) as fundamentally dictated by necessity and/or moral impera-
tive. Thus, in its first statement, the Judicial Chamber announced that it was
"necessary" to issue a formal condemnation of mass media use of unsubstan-
tiated rumors, stories, and reports, which "fuel tragic interethnic conflict,"
"overt immorality," "defamation" of government institutions, and "destabili-
zation of the sociopolitical situation."3 It focused particular attention on a
Zavtra article entitled "Kremlin Secrets." It acknowledged that its denuncia-
tion of this article would have no legal or practical impact."3 5 Nonetheless,
the Judicial Chamber felt obligated to speak because it would be "wrong" to
allow such an "odious publication" "to remain unheeded and unassessed." 3 6
The Judicial Chamber conveys this image of compelled performance
most powerfully through its presentation of facts. In each case, it constructs
the facts in a way that makes a comprehensive response by the Judicial
Chamber appear both unavoidable and essential to the future of Russia. The
Judicial Chamber typically starts the facts section of its opinions with a
detailed and dramatic description of the allegedly harmful material at issue.
It does not merely characterize the publication or broadcast as, for instance,
"pornographic" or "subversive" or recapitulate the content in moderate,
judicious language. Instead, it sets out the subject matter in colorful, even
232. See supra note 90.
233. Statement No. 2, supra note 110.
234. Statement No. 1, supra note 125.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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gory detail. It cites graphic and offensive titles and reproduces provocative
and outrageous excerpts from texts and videotapes."
The Judicial Chamber makes no attempt to present the facts in a neutral
fashion and to invite the reader to determine if the material is harmful or
innocuous. It injects its own evaluations of publications, broadcasts, and
parties throughout its opinions in blunt, unequivocal language. For example,
in one decision, it introduced the facts section thus: "The publication
'Chechen Knot. 13 Theses' is obviously provocative in nature."238 It then
proceeded to castigate a Novyi vzgliad author for "delirious fabrications,"
"absurdity," "insulting, vile epithets," "unidimensional and primitive" style,
and "misanthropic ideology.""
In its construction of facts, the Judicial Chamber also makes a conscious
effort to place each individual case into a broader context." It redefines the
specific publication or program at issue as part of an overall harmful speech
crisis that threatens Russian society, state, and democratic reform process.
In so doing, it suggests that even the smallest transgression can lead to
disastrous consequences. By recasting the individual harmful publication or
broadcast as part of the larger threat to Russia rather than an isolated inci-
dent, the Judicial Chamber establishes a claim of authority for both decision
and decision maker. The Judicial Chamber strengthens this claim in many
opinions by tracing the misconduct under examination and the general
harmful speech problem, in part, to official inaction." As a result, the
Judicial Chamber appears to have no alternative but to respond. Anything
else would be irresponsible and unthinkable.
The language, voice, and tone of Judicial Chamber opinions reinforce
this impression of inevitability and compelled performance. Judicial Cham-
237. See Decision No. 7, supra note 91 (listing provocative titles of Novyi vzgliad
publications); Expert Conclusion No. 5, supra note 120 (reproducing numerous quotations
from Kolokol articles).
238. Decision No. 42, supra note 96.
239. Id.
240. See Decision No. 58, supra note 126 (using Kin Television case to show that
"ignorance of the rules for preelection agitation can result in disinformation of the populace,
deception of potential voters regarding the dates and procedure for nomination and registration
of deputy candidates and their participation in the election campaign" and to emphasize "the
great social-political significance of rigorous compliance by the mass media with election
legislation").
241. See Decision No. 15, supra note 93 (noting that "[u]nfortunately.... the Russian
Press Committee did not take any measures prescribed by law against the newspaper Zavtra"
after Judicial Chamber issued statement condemning earlier publication by newspaper);
Decision No. 69, supra note 139 (reporting "intolerable inaction" by prison employees to stop
illegal filming of convicts).
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ber opinions feature extensive use of words of obligation and necessity. 21
Moreover, all published opinions are written in a univocal (or "mono-
logic"243) third person singular. They are signed by Chairman Vengerov, not
by individual judges.' There are no separate dissenting or concurring
opinions that might suggest other readings of facts and law.US The tone
is engaged, emotional, and judgmental. Opinions exude "concern,"2
"regret,"27 and, above all, "righteous indignation""UB about the case at hand
and the general state of affairs in Russia. These factors combine to create
a sense of unanimity and certitude. They send a clear message to the reader:
There is only one possible interpretation of the facts and it is an interpreta-
tion that demands immediate and decisive action.
A prime illustration of these techniques is Decision No. 21, the Judicial
Chamber's broad-scale attack on "mass media publications that incite social
and nationalist intolerance."2 9 Although the Judicial Chamber was the
formal initiator of the opinion, it began its decision with the statement that
242. See Decision No. 35, supra note 97 (noting Judicial Chamber was "forced to
intervene"); Decision No. 58, supra note 126 (stating Klin Television leadership and journal-
ists were "obliged to consider legislative requirements" on preelection canvassing in prepara-
tion of broadcasts); Expert Conclusion No. 5, supra note 120 (stating Judicial Chamber
"deems it necessary" to send opinion to Procurator General and Russian Press Committee for
further action and to prepare draft amendments to Law on the Mass Media, and "deems it
advisable" to publish opinion in Rossiiskaia gazeta).
243. Ferguson, supra note 30, at pt. Hl.
244. In contrast, the Judicial Chamber Regulations call for the signature of Judicial
Chamber members. Judicial Chamber Regulations, supra note 92, point 26.
245. According to the Statute on the Judicial Chamber and the Judicial Chamber Regula-
tions, decisions are adopted by a majority of the total number of Judicial Chamber members
(as are statements, recommendations, and expert conclusions). Statute on the Judicial Cham-
ber, supra note 12, art. 30; Judicial Chamber Regulations, supra note 92, point 25. Repri-
mands and proposals to terminate media activity or to issue warnings to media founders or
editorial staffs, however, must be approved by a "consensus" of Judicial Chamber members.
Id. The Judicial Chamber Regulations specifically provide that a member "who disagrees with
the majority opinion can state in writing his separate opinion, which is attached to the case."
Id. No such opinions have been published thus far either in Rossiskaia gazeta or the Judicial
Chamber's own collection of opinions.
246. Decision No. 44, supra note 83 ("The Judicial Chamber shares the concern of the
public.., about the spread of fascism in Russia today.").
247. Decision No. 50, supra note 90 ("The Judicial Chamber also notes with regret that
S. Parkhomenko's article turned out to be only one in a series of publications, which often
appear in the mass media, that are unobjective and insulting to the young institutions of
statehood of democratic Russia.").
248. Lasser, supra note 70, at 1385.
249. Decision No. 21, supra note 83.
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it had "received many appeals from social organizations and individu-
als" ' about such publications. The Judicial Chamber proceeded to provide
a detailed description of specific racist, fascist, and anti-governmental arti-
cles with direct citation to titles and text. For example, it reproduced the
title of a Zavira article, "Yeltsinism-Hilterism," as evidence of that newspa-
per's "utter refusal to accept legitimate authority.""1 It quoted a Narodnoi
stroi article's call for creation of an empire dedicated to "preservation and
cultivation of the Aryan element... as first among Russians."2
Throughout Decision No. 21, the Judicial Chamber emphasized the
general societal implications of such publications. According to the Judicial
Chamber, "crude and unsubstantiated attacks against. . . institutions of
Russian statehood" promote "social intolerance."' 3 Publications that "create
negative etlmic stereotypes" constitute a "social danger." 4 They inspire
"nationalist radicals" and "extremists" and "supply an "ideological base" for
fascist armed groups.'
The Judicial Chamber also made a point of noting the futile efforts of
governmental authorities to control media "abuse of freedom of mass infor-
mation."" 6 It castigated registration bodies, the Russian Press Committee,
the procuracy, and the legislature for their inadequate responses to this
critical societal problem. This led the Judicial Chamber to the inescapable
conclusion that it must step to the fore and take action. In the words of the
Judicial Chamber, "It is impossible to tolerate any longer this abnormal
and socially dangerous situation in which mass media publications incite
social and nationalist hatred. " With this claim of authority grounded in
dire necessity, the Judicial Chamber concluded Decision No. 21 with a
series of strikingly comprehensive proposals. It did not confine its remedies
to the specific publications at issue, but rather, provided a blueprint for
overall systemic reform, with the Judicial Chamber as architect, guide, and
overseer. Thus, the notion of "compelled performance" is ultimately trans-
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2. Judicial Chamber Roles
The Judicial Chamber, then, assumes the mantle of Russia's savior, a
position not chosen for itself but thrust upon it by sheer force of circum-
stances. In this capacity, it sets for itself an agenda that ranges far beyond
that stipulated in its founding documents. Under the Judicial Chamber's self-
fashioned program, it must do more than resolve information disputes and
correct infractions of mass media legislation. It must also communicate the
enormity of the harmful speech problem to spur official and public concern,
identify the root causes of the problem, and offer constructive solutions.
In its least controversial role, the Judicial Chamber portrays itself as
adjudicator of disputes. It is a trier of fact and applier of law. It considers
evidence, evaluates party testimony and arguments, and applies existing
domestic and international law norms and rules to specific fact situations. 8
The Judicial Chamber also speaks as a stem but fair disciplinarian. It repri-
mands offenders, metes out punishment, weighs mitigating factors, and when
necessary, calls for further corrective action.2 9 Moreover, in several cases,
the Judicial Chamber appears as special guardian of the weak and powerless.
It makes particular efforts to protect the young and naive from corruption,
fraud, and deception.26
In addition, the Judicial Chamber often figures as investigator and
prosecutor. It scrutinizes publications and broadcasts for possible infringe-
ment of constitutional and mass media legislation and institutes proceedings
on its own initiative against violators."6 Similarly, the Judicial Chamber
independently uncovers and censures governmental misconduct in the mass
media sphere.262
The Judicial Chamber also speaks as dramatic raconteur. It conveys to
the reader of its opinions the crisis proportions of Russia's harmful speech
threat. Through the use of powerful language and imagery, it recasts each
case as a morality play, part of the Manichean struggle between the forces
of good and evil for control of Russia's soul and destiny.263
258. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 83, 100 and accompanying text.
260. See Decision No. 7, supra note 91 (condemning Novyi vzgliad publications as
"serious threat to the moral interests of children and adolescents"); Decision No. 16, supra
note 90 (ruling against fraudulent television lottery); Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140
(condemning dissemination of dangerous advertisements).
261. See Decision No. 7, supra note 91 (noting Judicial Chamber on its own initiative
examined and condemned "immoral," "offensive" publications in Novyi vzgliad).
262. See Joint Recommendations, supra note 147 (criticizing officials for threatening news-
papers, terrorizing journalists, impeding media access to information, and accepting bribes).
263. See supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Judicial Chamber portrays itself as objective and con-
structive outside critic of Russia's mass media system.' As such, it appears
uniquely qualified to conduct the full and impartial examination required to
determine the sources of and contributents to Russia's harmful speech
problem. In this capacity of diagnostician, the Judicial Chamber highlights
fundamental systemic and attitudinal defects - a flawed and inadequate
legislative base; haphazard enforcement by the state and the mass media;
adverse, unintended effects of recent political, economic, and institutional
reforms; and above all, the failure of Russian government, media, and public
alike to "understand" the proper role of a "free press" in a post-Soviet
democracy.m
Finally, the Judicial Chamber defines itself as both architect and execu-
tor of an effective response to Russia's harmful speech challenge. In these
functions, it assigns itself a variety of roles and responsibilities. It views
itself as law creator, formulating statutory and regulatory schemes to address
legislative gaps and defects in such critical areas as media registration,
dissemination of fascist materials and deceptive advertisements, and media
access to state personnel, meetings, and documents. 2 6 The Judicial Chamber
also assumes the position of economic and institutional reformer. It recom-
mends adoption of economic policies to "strengthen" the press and limit
dependence on government and commercial sponsors.2 7 Moreover, it calls
for an overhaul of federal, regional, and local government procedures and
bodies to improve the institutional machinery for enforcement of media
rights and responsibilities.68
For the Judicial Chamber, its most important and contested role is that
of teacher and moral guide of Russian society.2" Since its inception, the
Judicial Chamber has launched a massive campaign to train and educate
Russian government, press, and citizenry about the appropriate status, rights,
and responsibilities of a post-Soviet democratic press. It self-consciously
264. See Statement No. 4, supra note 80 (describing objective criticism by Judicial Cham-
ber, which threatened the "comfortable existence" of media and government organizations).
265. For an extended discussion of these points, see Foster, supra note 80, at pt. II.
266. See Decision No. 21, supra note 83 (regarding registration); Decision No. 44, supra
note 83 (regarding fascist materials); Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140 (regarding
advertisements). See generally V.N. Monakhov, Judicial Chamber - Creator of Law or
Lawlessness?, in JuDICiAL CHAMBER CoLLE CrION, supra note 12, at 162 (describing "law
creation functions" of Judicial Chamber).
267. See Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
268. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
269. For an example of press criticism, see Klimov, supra note 12 (expressing "doubt and
concern" about Judicial Chamber's role as teacher).
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directs its opinions toward the outside reader as well as the parties. It uses
each dispute as a point of departure to interpret and explain broad constitu-
tional and legal guarantees of speech, press, and information freedom and
their legal and ethical limits.
A good example of this didactic role of the Judicial Chamber appears
in Decision No. 69, the ruling against A. G. Nevzorov's television expos6
of Russian women's correctional facilities.270 The Judicial Chamber took
care to explain to the reader that "in general" media coverage of Russian
penitentiaries "deserves support. ,27' It emphasized that "openness" of the
prison system to the mass media and thus public opinion has practical value
and explicit statutory basis.' Such coverage is an "essential condition" to
ensure observance of "generally-accepted principles and norms"'2 within
prisons. Moreover, "[t]he right of a journalist to collect and disseminate
information, including information about the penitentiary system and its
actual problems, is recognized and guaranteed by Russian legislation. " 274
The Judicial Chamber then proceeded to clarify that the media's right to
information is not absolute: "However, realization of this right must not
become the grounds and excuse for infringing the constitutional rights of
citizens, including prisoners, to inviolability of private life. "' It concluded
that by filming convicts without their consent, Nevzorov "flagrantly vio-
lated" constitutional, statutory, and ethical norms. 276
As the above example indicates, the Judicial Chamber speaks as moral
arbiter as well as teacher. The Judicial Chamber, whose task consists of
reminding Russian government, press, and public of the serious ethical
principles and values at stake in harmful speech cases, is the conscience of
the community. In virtually every opinion, it defines media infractions as
violations of both law and "generally-recognized ethical norms."2' It
conducts a public trial of the moral character and conduct of parties. It
excoriates media and government defendants, holding them up as object
lessons for public ridicule and censure." It also makes a point of communi-







277. See Decision No. 7, supra note 91 (reprimanding Novyi vzgliad editor-in-chief for
violations of "legal and generally-recognized ethical norms").
278. See Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (describing Ekspress-gazeta editorial office and
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eating any mitigating factors, evidence of repentance, or other positive atti-
tudes or behavior by parties. 9 Throughout its opinions, the Judicial Charn-
ber stresses the need to supplement legal methods with extralegal techniques.
It calls upon parties to find "civilized" and "acceptable" means to settle
information disputes and remedy losses informally.m It urges self-regulation
by professions, internal control by media and state organizations, and per-
sonal "self-restraint" by journalists."al It favors extensive use of publicity as
a sanction and deterrent.'
The Judicial Chamber's concerted effort and directive to combine legal
and moral norms and techniques is the most notable and controversial aspect
of its opinions and its charter for the future.m This blended approach is also
the key feature of the Judicial Chamber's distinctive "conversation" about
law, a topic that will be explored in Part V of this Article.
their publications as "elementarily ignorant," "confused," "absurd," "indecent," "malicious,"
and "insulting").
279. See Decision No. 44, supra note 83 ("tak[ing] into consideration the readiness of
VGTRK to correct its admitted mistake regarding the 'Sirena' corporation").
280. See Decision No. 16, supra note 90 ("commend[ing]" telephone company for
independently reimbursing participants in television lottery); Decision No. 35, supra note 97
(noting "many of the problems involved in realization of freedom of mass information in
Primorskii krai are the result of the krai authorities' inability or unwillingness to establish an
equal, civilized dialogue with the press").
281. See Decision No. 54, supra note 148 (urging advertising community to develop
scheme of self-regulation to prevent production and dissemination of illegal and improper
advertisements); Decision No. 35, supra note 97; Decision No. 37, supra note 83; Joint
Recommendations, supra note 147.
282. See Bychkova, supra note 8, at A7 (citing Vengerov); Anatolii Vengerov, Comments
at Press Conference (Sept. 6, 1994), in POST-SovIET MEDiA L. & POL'Y NEWSL., Oct. 15,
1994, at 3, 4 ("Sometimes public censure is serious, very serious."). The Judicial Chamber
has recommended extensive media coverage of "abuses of freedom of mass information,"
prime offenders, and responses by law enforcement organs. See Decision No. 21, supra note
83. It orders media to retract or "rectify" false, inaccurate, misleading, and libelous stories
and often requires publication of its own critical evaluations of texts and authors. See
Decision No. 30, supra note 82 (ordering Sobesednik to publish Judicial Chamber ruling
against newspaper); Decision No. 27 (64) On the Appeal by Russian Federation Federal
Assembly State Duma Deputy V.N. Lysenko Regarding Inaccurate Information Broadcast on
the "Vremia" Program (ORT) (Sept. 22, 1995), Ross. GAzErA, Sept. 30, 1995, at 4 [herein-
after Decision No. 64] (ordering ORT to "rectify" in future broadcast "inaccurate" references
to Deputy V.N. Lysenko).
283. A revealing example of this "blended" approach appeared in Statement No. 1: "A
legal barrier should be erected against insolent, shameless, and groundless attacks on the
institutions of Russian statehood, their leaders and representatives and here, ethical values
should be used." Statement No. 1, supra note 125.
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3. Self-Limitations
The Judicial Chamber has received little appreciation for its efforts to
rescue the Russian society, state, and democracy from the harmful speech
challenge. Critics commonly depict the Judicial Chamber as an extraconsti-
tutional body that dispenses "justice" on an ad hoc basis in accordance with
its own notions of law and morality.m The Judicial Chamber's self-portrait
is markedly different. It views its decision making and authority as subject
to real procedural, factual, and legal constraints. Throughout its opinions,
it makes a point of emphasizing and reassuring the reader of these limita-
tions.
In its opinions, the Judicial Chamber conveys the impression that it
operates within defined procedural and institutional parameters. It acts upon
receipt of formal petitions from plaintiffs and considers counterclaims by
media and government defendants.' After due notice to parties, 26 it holds
"judicial hearings," in which designated "representatives" of parties partici-
pate.' It acknowledges limits on its jurisdiction to hear cases. For exam-
ple, in Decision No. 51, the Judicial Chamber expressly declined to provide
a "legal evaluation" of a republic presidential decree, liability of a newspaper
editorial office, "other questions of a property nature," and contributory
actions by nonparty organizations on grounds that such matters fell outside
its competencen 8
Similarly, the Judicial Chamber indicates qualified authority to remedy
violations of mass media legislation. Often it confines itself to reprimanding
284. See Oleg Revenko, Has an Administrative Body Been Created?, Ross. GAZETA,
May 13, 1995, at 6 (stating Judicial Chamber authority violates Constitution); Dmitrii
Shteinberg, I am for the Judicial Chamber, But .... Ross. GAZETA, May 13, 1995, at 6
(criticizing Judicial Chamber for its "disrespectful and insulting" language that is "inconsistent
with law and ethics," its arbitrary and "peculiar" interpretation of statutes, its lack of concern
for due process, and its unconstitutional powers).
285. See Decision No. 48, supra note 82 (considering formal petition from the Chairman
of Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support of New Eco-
nomic Structures regarding Izvestiia publication and counterclaim by Izvestiia's representative
that Judicial Chamber lacked competence to hear case).
286. See Decision No. 16, supra note 90 (noting defendant was "informed of... Judicial
Chamber hearing... in a timely manner"). But see Shteinberg, supra note 284 (criticizing
Judicial Chamber for providing Rossiiskaia gazeta inadequate notice of time and date of
hearing).
287. See Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (involving participation in hearing by representa-
tives of State Duma's Legal Affairs Department and of Ekspress-gazeta).
288. Decision No. 51, supra note 142. But see supra note 82 (discussing Judicial
Chamber's assertion of expansive jurisdiction to new cases involving slander or libel of public
officials).
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offenders and issuing nonbinding "proposals" for further action against
defendants." It forwards case materials to the proper governmental and
media channels and personnel "for adoption of measures stipulated by
law. "2  In many opinions, the Judicial Chamber reinforces this concern for
procedural regularity by requiring formal publication in the official source
for Judicial Chamber documents - Rossiiskaia gazeta.
291
Judicial Chamber treatment of evidence and testimony points to another
important constraint on decision making. It suggests that the Judicial Cham-
ber can render judgment only after a thorough consideration of all facts,
viewpoints, and circumstances. Opinions contain lengthy lists of documents
and experts consulted by the Judicial Chamber.2  They also record the
names of speakers at formal hearings (the parties, their representatives, and
interested third persons). 93 In several opinions, the Judicial Chamber
discusses presentations by claimants and defendants, noting strengths and,
especially, weaknesses in both sides' arguments. 29' In addition, the Judicial
Chamber often explicitly draws on expert or party testimony and materials
to support its arguments and conclusions. For instance, in its recommenda-
tion condemning dissemination of dangerous advertisements, it cited "exten-
sive data" supplied by the Ministry of Health, "revealing that smoking has
become an alarming problem in Russia and showing the increase in fatalities
from smoking and the rise in numbers of teenaged and women smokers
(including pregnant women). "295
Judicial Chamber opinions call attention to the legal as well as factual
bases of decisions. The message is that all rulings are grounded in and even
dictated by law, not personal whim or subjective determination. The Judicial
Chamber takes care to support its conclusions with direct citation to govern-
289. See Decision No. 32, supra note 93 (reprimanding author of television program and
proposing that All-Russian State Television and Company leadership "bring disciplinary
proceedings against the people responsible for broadcasting" program).
290. Decision No. 7, supra note 91.
291. See supra note 101.
292. See supra notes 93, 95.
293. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
294. For example, in Decision No. 11, the Judicial Chamber rejected Ekspress-gazeta's
argument that because it was a "young" newspaper it had to employ a sensationalistic style to
"get on [its] feet" and "defeat [its] rivals." Decision No. 11, supra note 83. The Judicial
Chamber stated that it was "impermissible to assert that one can use cheap sensations, publish
untrue and insulting materials, and mock the institutions of Russian statehood for the sake of
winning in the newspaper market." Id.; see also Decision No. 50, supra note 90 (rejecting
Segodnia argument that publication of materials in so-called "author's column" relieves author
and editor-in-chief from liability for abuse of mass information).
295. Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140.
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ing domestic and international law norms and rules. For example, in its
ruling against media dissemination of discriminatory employment advertise-
ments, the Judicial Chamber quoted verbatim guarantees of gender equality
set forth in the Russian Constitution and Labor Code and the United Nations
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.'
Moreover, in every opinion, the Judicial Chamber prefaces its holdings, state-
ments, and recommendations with explicit reference to authorizing provisions
in its Statute or Regulations and, occasionally, other Russian legislation."'
Finally, the Judicial Chamber makes an effort throughout its opinions
to persuade the reader that its approach to harmful speech cases is reasonable
and balanced. For instance, in Statement No. 2 the Judicial Chamber re-
ported that it had "refrained from hasty conclusions about the accuracy of the
publication" at issue.29 This was due to the fact that there was an ongoing
criminal investigation of the case, "the results of which [were] still un-
known." 99 The Judicial Chamber also conveys a sense of cautious, balanced
decision making by emphasizing the positive as well as negative aspects of
media dissemination of information. Thus, it will pledge its support for such
general principles as "pluralism" and "professional creative freedom of
journalists" in the same opinion that it denounces a specific case of media
"abuse of freedom of mass information. DO
An excellent illustration of this technique appears in Decision No. 43,
the Judicial Chamber's ruling against "unreliable," "inaccurate," and "insult-
ing" critiques of Russia's draft advertising law.3"' In this opinion, the Judi-
cial Chamber applauded "legitimate and constructive" media criticism of the
bill. 3" According to the Judicial Chamber, such publications were "justi-
fied" and could potentially "contribute to improvement of the draft law."33
The Judicial Chamber expressed its sensitivity to the "understandable" press
"concern" about the content of the law and its implications for economic
reform, the market economy, and "formation of an economic base for
independence of the mass media. "" It then meticulously distinguished the
296. Decision No. 5, supra note 90.
297. See, e.g., Decision No. 64, supra note 282 (citing Articles 4, 9, and 10 of Statute
on the Judicial Chamber and Article 19 of Civil Code).
298. Statement No. 2, supra note 110.
299. Id.
300. Decision No. 32, supra note 93.
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materials before it from exemplary "objective, reliable, and professional"
critiques.0" In so doing, the Judicial Chamber communicated that its deci-
sion should not be read as an arbitrary, blanket condemnation of all media
critique but, rather, as a reasonable, narrow ruling against publications that
misstated, distorted, and discredited the substance and goals of the draft
advertising law.3"
V. Judicial Chamber Conversation
In the final analysis, the Judicial Chamber defines itself as, above all,
a legal institution.3" According to its members, it is "guided by principles
of law" and subject to the "high ethical demands"'°9 of law. It defends and
upholds "legal principles" even in the face of official, media, and public
opposition."' Its mission is not only to apply law but also to "explain,"
"reveal," and "create" law.3" Thus, Judicial Chamber opinions are as much
a "conversation" about law as a "performance." They communicate to
parties, legal and journalistic communities, and lay audience alike the
Judicial Chamber's vision of law in post-Soviet Russia.
A. General Parameters: Law, Democracy, and Mass Media
The starting point for any Judicial Chamber conversation about law is
the 1993 Russian Constitution. According to the Judicial Chamber, the
Constitution is Russia's first step toward a democracy ruled by law. Unlike
ceremonial dead letter constitutions of the past, this Constitution is a "liv-
ing," "working" document."' It is the fundamental guarantee of Russian
democracy, human rights, and irreversibility of the reform process. It is the
305. Id.
306. Id. For a critical reaction to this opinion, see Boris Piliatskin, Antimonopoly Com-
mittee Wants Monopoly Control of Advertising and Is Trying To Take the Press in Hand,
IZvEsTIIA, Mar. 21, 1995, at 5, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Apr. 7, 1995, at 57.
307. Iu. V. Feofanov, The Fifth Item in the Crime Questionnaire, in JUDICIAL CHAMBER
COLLEI-ON, supra note 12, at 169, 172 ("Mhe Judicial Chamber considers itself, first and
foremost, a legal institution").
308. Id.
309. Vengerov, supra note 106, at 142.
310. Feofanov, supra note 307, at 172.
311. Monakhov, supra note 266, at 165.
312. Report of the Russian Federation Presidential Judicial Chamber for Information
Disputes On the State of Affairs in the Russian Federation with Respect to Observance of
Freedom of Mass Information in 1994 (Jan. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Report], in JUDICIAL
CHAMBER COLLECTION, supra note 12, at 173, 176 ("Mhe Constitution lives and works.").
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 923 (1997)
"ultimate defense against the tyranny of officials 3 13 and the "poisonous
weeds 31 4 of fascism, separatism, anarchy, and immorality that threaten to
strangle the young "sprouts 31 5 of Russian democracy and legality. The
Constitution establishes guiding principles for all spheres of activity -
political, economic, social, spiritual, as well as legal. It deserves utmost
respect and deference from Russian government authorities, and citizenry.
The Judicial Chamber emphasizes, however, that the Constitution is
only a broad charter. It must be fleshed out and concretized by Russian
legislation. Admittedly, Russia's current legislative base is incomplete,
imperfect, and underenforced.316 Nonetheless, even in its rudimentary form,
Russian legislation is beginning to develop into a source of "powerful legal
protection 3 17 for the Russian Constitution and reform process.
The central question for the Judicial Chamber, then, is how to translate
the evolving post-Soviet "law on the books" into reality. One response is
widespread popularization, extension, and penetration of law throughout
Russian state and society. As the Judicial Chamber often emphasizes in its
opinions, ignorance of law is no defense. 8 Indeed, it may actually impede
Russia's advance toward democracy and the rule of law. For the Judicial
Chamber, however, knowledge and mastery of relevant constitutional and
statutory rules is only part of the answer. What is essential as well is a
shared societal understanding and internalization of the ethical values and
principles that infuse and animate legal provisions. 9 According to the
Judicial Chamber, the crucial task of the present transitional stage is to instill
in Russian society a knowledge and respect for both the spirit and letter of
the law. In short, Russia must develop a new legal culture, one that will
speed its progress from its totalitarian "rule of man" past to its democratic
"rule of law" future.
The Judicial Chamber traces many of the current problems in the mass
media sphere to this very lack of legal culture. It argues that media, govern-
ment, and public do not appreciate the full legal and ethical dimensions of
new constitutional guarantees of press, expressive, and information free-
313. Id. at 177.
314. Id. at 175.
315. Id. at 185.
316. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
317. Report, supra note 312, at 178.
318. See, e.g., Decision No. 58, supra note 126 (dismissing television channel director's
argument that he should be relieved from liability due to his ignorance of electoral law
requirements for pre-election canvassing).
319. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
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doms. In particular, it cites the general failure to understand that rights
come with responsibilities. For the Judicial Chamber, the highest legal and
ethical duty of every Russian citizen - journalist, publisher, government
official, and media consumer alike - is to exercise rights "responsibly" with
due consideration for the interests of Russian society."
B. What Kind of Conversation?
1. Rejection of White's Democratic and Authoritarian Typologies
The Judicial Chamber's conversation is a conversation about democracy
yet is not "democratic" as defined by Professor White in the U.S. context.
Clearly, this is not a conversation among equals.321 Throughout its opinions,
the Judicial Chamber stakes out a position of dominance vis-A-vis its reader.
Whether in the capacity of judge, teacher, moral arbiter, or disciplinarian, "
it claims a superior understanding of the form, substance, and goals of
Russia's evolving legal system. Moreover, unlike White's democratic
conversation, 3z the Judicial Chamber explicitly excludes some individuals
from participation - those journalists and publishers that are so evil or
incorrigible as to be beyond redemption or appeal.2
The Judicial Chamber's conversation diverges from the democratic
model in other crucial aspects. The Judicial Chamber does not draw on
shared values or understandings of such fundamental concepts as democracy
or the rule of law.3z It seeks to create and inculcate such values. The
Judicial Chamber also does not attempt to engage the independent judgment
or critical reasoning of the reader and invite him to apply law to complex
fact situations on his own.Y2 Instead, it guides and teaches the reader how
to do so. Furthermore, the Judicial Chamber does not "hol[d] up its own
efforts to [audience] scrutiny and criticism."32 It asserts and defends its
320. See Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
321. See WHITE, supra note 13, at 157, 172 (discussing equality and openness of demo-
cratic conversation).
322. See supra Part V.C.2.
323. See WHrTE, supra note 13, at 154-57 (using Brandeis opinion in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), to illustrate inclusive aspects of
democratic conversation).
324. See supra notes 165, 188 and accompanying text.
325. See WHrrE, supra note 13, at 157.
326. See id. at 101 (noting democratic conversation defines reader "as a free agent - who
in reading the text is encouraged to activate these capacities" and "invite[s] the use of mind
and judgment in its readers").
327. Id. at 172.
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authority as legal and moral actor.3" Indeed, it often appears hypersensitive
to outside criticism.329
The Judicial Chamber does not adopt the democratic format because it
cannot do so. Such a conversation requires all participants to know, accept,
and share basic notions of law and legality as well as a common commitment
to and definition of democracy and the rule of law. With the low level of
legal culture in Russia today, the Judicial Chamber addresses an audience
that lacks familiarity and respect for legal norms and rules. Moreover, as
repeated political and ethnic crises underscore, it speaks to an audience
deeply divided by cultural, ethnic, and ideological differences, with sharply
divergent views regarding Russia's past, present, and future. Thus, at this
point in Russian history, a democratic conversation about law would appear
to be both premature and futile.
At first glance, the Judicial Chamber's conversation seems to fit the
authoritarian model identified by White in U.S. opinions. The Judicial
Chamber "reduces difficulty to simplicity."330 It often characterizes facts
and law with a "blunt and unquestioning finality"331 and "demands simple
and total obedience 32 of its reader to those interpretations. It claims for
itself the authority, even the obligation, to "remake" constitutional and
statutory language at will.333 It repeatedly rejects "legalistic argumenta-
328. See supra Part IV.C.
329. See Vengerov, supra note 106, at 142-44; Statement No. 4, supra note 80.
330. WHrrE, supra note 13, at 147.
331. Id. at 145.
332. Id. at 101.
333. The Judicial Chamber views Russia's skeletal legislative base as creating a danger-
ous vacuum, which facilitates widespread violations of citizens' constitutional rights and
freedoms. It sees itself as obligated to fill this gap in practice. Accordingly, it independently
remakes constitutional and statutory language to ensure full legal coverage of specific fact
patterns and problems. For example, a common technique is to insert adjectives to modify
constitutional provisions. Thus, the Judicial Chamber often restates the constitutional right
to receive information as the right to receive "reliable" or "objective" information. See
Statement No. 11, supra note 161 (noting constitutional "right of citizens to receive reliable
and objective information"); Decision No. 2, supra note 90 (noting citizens' right to receive
"reliable and prompt information"). Another approach is to expand existing statutory cate-
gories and definitions. For instance, in a number of opinions, it unilaterally extends the
concept of "abuse of freedom of mass information," set out in Article 4 of the Law on the
Mass Media, to cases involving media critique of government officials and institutions. See
Decision No. 48, supra note 82 (stating Izvestiia story about government official "represented
an abuse of freedom of mass information"); Decision No. 11 (94) On the Appeal by R.F.
Minister of Construction, E.V. Basin, Regarding Iu. Kalinina's Publication "'The Golden
Calf' of the Chechen Republic" in Issue No. 2 of the Journal "Itogi" (June 27, 1996), Ross.
GAzETA, July 10, 1996, at 6 [hereinafter Decision No. 94] (noting Itogi critique of Ministry
RUSSIAN JUDICIAL CHAMBER DISCO URSE AND NARRATIVE 977
tion" '334 in favor of vague, often unarticulated ethical principles and stan-
dards.335 The most powerful argument to the Judicial Chamber is framed not
in terms of a reasoned discussion of legal norms and rules but rather in
accordance with the Judicial Chamber's notions of responsibility and benefit
to Russian society." 6 Like White's authoritarian judge, the Judicial Chamber
thus emerges as a "wise judge, entitled to act as the 'conscience' of the
community."3 37 It "assert[s]" "the power of the moral, aesthetic, and civi-
lized actor over the language and categories of the law."33
Yet, as I explain in detail in the next section, the Judicial Chamber's
conversation is not authoritarian in the strictest sense. The essential differ-
ence is that the Judicial Chamber does not seek to impose a vision on its
audience. Instead, it makes a real effort to guide, persuade, and train its
reader. In essence, its goal is to prepare its reader for participation at some
future date in a genuinely open and free democratic conversation.
The Judicial Chamber rejects the authoritarian model because it too is
incompatible with current Russian conditions. First, such a format would
likely be ineffective in achieving the Judicial Chamber's principal objec-
tive - creating the new legal culture needed for a full-fledged Russian
democracy ruled by law. It is impossible to change long-standing popular
attitudes and customs - let alone develop a legal culture from scratch -
overnight by mere fiat. Second, an authoritarian conversation would lack
theoretical and popular legitimacy. Resort to authoritarian techniques would
suggest historical associations with Russia's discredited Tsarist and Soviet
totalitarian past and would likely generate popular resistance. Third, from
a purely practical institutional standpoint, such an approach would be prob-
lematic. The Judicial Chamber has minimal enforcement powers to back up
its commands.339 Moreover, as a new body, it is unable to draw on an
historical track record or reservoir of popular respect for and compliance
with its rulings. To make matters worse, because of its uncertain status in
of Construction constituted "abuse of freedom of mass information"). This permits the
harshest possible penalties against offenders. For a critique of this expansion of "abuse of
freedom of mass information," see Shteinberg, supra note 284 (discussing Judicial Chamber's
"very peculiar interpretation of the Law on the Mass Media" and arguing that "one would
have to indulge in sheer fantasy" to take Judicial Chamber's position that "The Thief's Hat is
on Fire" constituted "abuse of freedom of mass information").
334. WHrra, supra note 13, at 109.
335. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 110.
337. WHrrE, supra note 13, at 111.
338. Id. at 109.
339. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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the Russian political, legal, and constitutional structure,3 it cannot even rely
on more established government organs to implement its decisions. The
Judicial Chamber without legal or practical authority could be authoritarian
in name only.
Thus, neither the "democratic" or "authoritarian" models proposed by
Professor White in the U.S. context adequately describe the Russian Judicial
Chamber's conversation about law. As I will demonstrate in the next sec-
tion, the best analytical framework for understanding Judicial Chamber opin-
ions is the "parental" model originated by Harold Berman in 1950.
2. Parental Conversation
a. Berman's Parental Law Model
In his pathbreaking study Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet
Law," Professor Berman introduced the concept of parental law to explain
the distinctive features of the evolving Soviet Russian legal system. The
cornerstone of the parental model is its emphasis on the "nurturing" or
"upbringing" role of law.4 2 This leads to a new definition of the relationship
between law and the people it addresses. Law is a "parent" and "teacher"
and the "subject of law" is a "child or youth to be trained, guided, disci-
plined, protected."" The parental model views the individual primarily in
terms of his/her membership in the group. It defines the legal person not as
an "independent possessor of rights and duties" but as a "dependent member
of the collective. "' As a result, the parental model places heavy emphasis
on cooperation and responsibility for group welfare.s It subordinates
individual rights to collective interests, regarding such rights as, in essence,
"conferred in trust 31 for society as a whole.
Another important feature of the parental model is its view of the transi-
tional, embryonic nature of society, state, and law. Just as the legal person
is "young," so too is the system in which he is located. Each citizen is part
of a "growing, unfinished, still immature society, which is moving toward
a new and higher phase of development."I
340. See supra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
341. BERMAN, supra note 19.
342. The Russian term is vospitatel'naia rol' sovetskogo prava. See Berman, Use of Law,
supra note 19, at 77.
343. BERMAN, supra note 19, at 205.
344. Id. at 204.
345. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET
LAW 285 (rev. ed., 1963); Berman, Use of Law, supra note 19, at 82.
346. Berman, Use ofLaw, supra note 19, at 80.
347. BERMAN, supra note 19, at 205.
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Law in the parental model has several basic goals. At the most immedi-
ate level, it seeks to "protect" the individual "against the consequences of his
own ignorance."' Its broader and more ambitious objective is to create the
appropriate internal conditions to advance society to the next stage of devel-
opment. 349 Accordingly, under the parental model, law must help "unite and
organize and educate" society 0 It must mold the thinking and law-con-
sciousness of each citizen to instill a genuine belief in and respect for official
legal values. 35' At the same time, law must promote the moral education of
society. It must "guide the people to virtue. "' In short, the parental model
calls for the use of law to accomplish nothing less than the transformation of
every citizen into the "new person" required for the establishment of a more
advanced order.5 3
The parental model relies primarily on "communication" and "example"
to achieve these goals. It envisions widespread "propagandizing" 314 of law,
that is, a concerted effort by legal institutions and personnel to "circulate
information about law 351 to the general populace. It also features "persua-
sion" and "suggestion" as tools of legal communication and socialization.5 6
Thus, in trials, it directs judges and counsel to "pay special attention to the
educational effect" of court proceedings on parties, courtroom spectators,
and the public at large.3' This includes identifying and explaining the
overall "social and political aspects of the case 35 8 in order to convince
immediate and outside audiences that statutory provisions are properly
applied to the specific facts at issue.
The parental model also turns to "example" as a technique to make
abstract legal and moral values accessible to the public. It calls for extensive
use of publicity. It presents concrete role models for public approbation and
emulation and "exposes" the "shame of offenders. "' Similarly, the parental
348. Id. at 204.
349. BERMAN, supra note 345, at 282.
350. BERMAN, supra note 19, at 205.
351. Id. at 282 ("Mhe main purpose of official law is to shape and develop that unofficial
law-consciousness, so that people will actually think and feel what the state, through official law,
prescribes").
352. Berman, The Use of Law, supra note 19, at 80.
353. Id. at 77.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 82.
357. Id. at 80. See generally Berman, Educational Role, supra note 19.
358. Berman, Use of Law, supra note 19, at 80.
359. Id. at 82.
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 923 (1997)
model "induces" offenders to confess, repent, and undergo public re-educa-
tion in order to inculcate and reinforce approved norms and patterns of
behavior in both offenders and society as a whole." °
b. Application to the Judicial Chamber
The Judicial Chamber defines the participants in its conversation about
law in a way that is markedly similar to that under Berman's parental model.
In its opinions, the Judicial Chamber converses with an audience of youths.
It speaks to the "young institutions of Russian statehood,"36' still shaky,
immature, and fundamentally unprepared to govern a post-Soviet democracy.
It addresses media recently liberated from the shackles of censorship, which
in their youthful exuberance commit excesses and abuses of their new-found
rights and freedoms. 52 It converses with media consumers, who are naive
and unsophisticated and require constant outside vigilance and protection
"against the consequences of their own ignorance."3 63 It speaks to litigants'
representatives and legal personnel with only a rudimentary knowledge of
law, who elevate the letter of the law over its spirit and mistake legal rights
for a license to act without constraint. 36' Finally, it addresses the public at
large, unversed in democratic and legal values and in need of careful guid-
ance, teaching, and training.
The tone of the Judicial Chamber's conversation is distinctly parental.
It is loving, protective, and educative, yet also stem, moralistic, and disci-
plinary. Like an overwrought parent, the Judicial Chamber at times reaches
the point of utter frustration with its audience's slow pace of learning and
continuing misbehavior despite repeated correction. It expresses this impa-
tience in bursts of intemperate language and occasionally retreats to lecturing
rather than guiding its reader.3
360. Id. In some cases, the court's role "is reduced to that of making the accused an
object lesson for others, attempting to humiliate him and to make hum suffer." Berman, Edu-
cational Role, supra note 19, at 92-93.
361. Decision No. 50, supra note 90.
362. See Feofanov, supra note 307, at 172 (discussing problems with "today's mass
media, which have broken loose from the vise of censorship").
363. BERMAN, supra note 19, at 204; see supra Part IV.B.4.
364. See Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140 (noting media representatives citing
gaps in Russian legislation and "corrective" administrative acts to justify dissemination of
"improper" advertisements).
365. See Decision No. 11, supra note 83 (describing Ekspress-gazeta editorial office and
their publications as "elementarily ignorant," "confused," "absurd," "indecent," "malicious,"
and "insulting"); Decision No. 50, supra note 90 (featuring repeated use of word "intolerable"
to describe media conduct).
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The basic goal of the Judicial Chamber's conversation is identical to that
of the parental model. It is to create the requisite conditions for Russia to
progress to the next, higher stage of development, in this case a democracy
ruled by law." Through its opinions, the Judicial Chamber endeavors to
raise popular law-consciousness. It attempts to familiarize the reader with
the existing legal framework. It sets out applicable constitutional and statu-
tory provisions and meticulously explains their scope and limits.367 It dem-
onstrates proper application (and nonapplication) of general legal principles
and rules to specific fact patterns with concrete illustrations.368 It also
outlines necessary reforms and improvements in Russia's legal system.
369
As under the parental model, the Judicial Chamber seeks to give its
reader a moral as well as legal education through its conversation about law.
It too attempts to "guide people to virtue,"070 to create a new post-Soviet
democratic citizenry that appreciates moral responsibilities as well as legal
rights. Throughout its opinions, the Judicial Chamber exalts "civility,"
"decency," "fairness," and other "generally-recognized ethical principles"
that are not set in stone or law, but are known to all right-minded citizens.
371
It emphasizes collective welfare over individual rights. As under the paren-
tal model, it views constitutional freedoms of expression, press, and informa-
tion as held in trust for the good of society as a whole.2
The Judicial Chamber also makes a real effort through its opinions to
"unite and organize 01 society. It attempts to create a sense of community
by identifying, isolating, and excommunicating outsiders. 74 It appeals to
public patriotism and pride in Russia's victory over "German Fascism" and
Soviet communism.3 75 It encourages shared commitment to the defense and
further development of post-Soviet democracy. The Judicial Chamber calls
366. See Monakhov, supra note 266, at 162 (describing Russia as "only on the path to
becoming lawful").
367. See Decision No. 33, supra note 83 (explaining and discussing conflicting provisions
of Law on the Mass Media and Law on the Status of Deputies).
368. See Recommendation No. 1, supra note 140 (applying Russian legislation to media
dissemination of "improper" advertisements).
369. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
370. Berman, Use of Law, supra note 19, at 80.
371. See supra notes 277-82 and accompanying text.
372. See Joint Recommendations, supra note 147.
373. BERMAN, supra note 19, at 205.
374. See supra notes 164-65, 188 and accompanying text.
375. Report, supra note 312 (lauding Russia's victory over its "totalitarian past" and over
"German Fascism"); see also A.K. Kopeika, Errors of Youth?, in JUDICIAL CHAMBER
COLLECTION, supra note 12, at 158, 158 (praising "achievements" of "democratic movement
in Russia").
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upon all elements of Russian society to join in a common struggle against the
forces that threaten the Russian state, society, and reform process - fascism,
immorality, ethnic separatism, antigovernmental propaganda, and the like. 76
It enlists the Russian government, professional associations, and the general
public in the battle against media dissemination of harmful speech.3" The
Judicial Chamber strives to make democracy and the rule of law the common
cause and unifying bond of Russian society.
As under the parental model, the Judicial Chamber relies heavily on
communication and example to achieve its objectives. In communicating
legal and moral norms and rules, it puts a premium on simplicity and acces-
sibility to the reader. It recasts complex fact situations in simple, unambigu-
ous terms.3 78 There are no gray areas or possible alternative interpretations
of the facts. Similarly, in its treatment of law, the Judicial Chamber tends
to paraphrase, summarize, and recapitulate statutory provisions in language
accessible to the lay reader. 79 It often removes potential uncertainties,
contradictions, or inconsistencies in statutory provisions."8° A prime exam-
ple is its approach to one of the thorniest constitutional issues worldwide -
the apparent conflict between the journalist's right to speak and the audi-
ence's right not to be harmed by that speech. The Judicial Chamber dis-
solves this conflict by redefining the constitutional right at issue as a collec-
tive right of the citizenry to receive information rather than an individual
right of the journalist to free expression.' It thus reduces each harmful
376. See Report, supra note 312 (outlining threats to Russian democratic development and
need for broad resistance).
377. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text. The Judicial Chamber calls for
similar collective action to defend media rights against official interference. See Statement
No. 3, supra note 9 (discussing need for "all citizens" to "understand" importance of freedom
of mass information and calling upon "all parties" to resolve problems relating to Russian
Press House); Statement No. 11, supra note 161 ("call[ing] on citizens and Russian military
forces" in Chechnia "to observe strictly the rights and legitimate interests of journalists and
to render them maximum assistance in fulfillment of their professional duty").
378. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text (discussing Judicial Chamber
treatment of facts).
379. See Decision No. 7 (90) On the Publications by E.V. Limonov (Savenko) "Hand
Grenade at Croats" and "Black List of Peoples" in the Newspaper "Limonka," Nos. 13 and
16 (1995) (Apr. 4, 1996), Ross. GAZETA, Apr. 11, 1996, at 6 [hereinafter Decision No. 90]
(summarizing provisions of Constitution, criminal law, Law on Rehabilitation of Repressed
Peoples, and Law on the Mass Media).
380. In some opinions, however, the Judicial Chamber deliberately points to problems
in statutory language and suggests needed reforms. See supra note 266 and accompanying
text.
381. Interestingly, the Judicial Chamber generally defines the official interference cases
as well as infringements of the constitutional right of citizens to receive information rather
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speech case to a simple question: Was the information disseminated by the
media beneficial or detrimental to the interests of Russian society as a whole?
In so doing, it avoids the use of complex, multi-factored or pronged tests to
balance individual and collective rights. It also eliminates the need for direct
evidence and evaluation of the actual impact of a publication or broadcast on
the immediate audience. The Judicial Chamber's sole concern is whether the
material in question has the potential to promote or undermine public welfare
in the broadest sense.
The Judicial Chamber also follows the parental model in its emphasis
on persuasion and suggestion as communicative devices. It self-consciously
constructs its opinions with an eye to convincing the reader of the propriety,
even necessity, of its action in the case at hand. As has been discussed
above,3  it uses a variety of techniques for this purpose. These include
depiction of parties' attitudes and misconduct in stark, dramatic language,
verbatim reproduction of offensive media titles and material, and extensive
use of dicta. Furthermore, as under the parental model, the Judicial Cham-
ber attempts to persuade the reader by highlighting the larger context and
implications of each case.3 It explains the social, political, economic, and
ideological causes of Russia's harmful speech problem and underscores its
threat to Russian society, state, and the democratic reform process.
Finally, in conformity with the parental model, the Judicial Chamber
regards "example" as a particularly effective technique to tutor its audience
in new, democratic notions of law and morality. It crafts its opinions as
virtual morality plays, featuring positive and negative role models.3s' It uses
party attitudes and conduct as concrete object lessons to make abstract,
unfamiliar values and rules accessible to the reader.3s It emphasizes shame,
repentance, confession, and reform. To achieve maximum educational and
demonstration effect, the Judicial Chamber reprimands and corrects behavior
that is not in strict violation of the law but, nonetheless, detrimental to the
overall interests of Russian society.3 Moreover, it does not confine its
than of expressive and press freedoms. See Decision No. 2, supra note 90 (defining exclusion
of media from government meeting as restricting citizens' right to receive information). This
reinforces the image of Russian press as representative or trustee of society rather than
independent actor.
382. See supra Part 1V.C.I.
383. See supra notes 240, 253-55 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Part IV.B.
385. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
386. See Decision No. 6, supra note 90 ("recogniz[ing]" that author "violated the require-
ments of generally-accepted ethical norms and was not sufficiently responsible as to the
possible consequences of her publication").
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inquiry to the specific litigants before it. It holds nonparties as well as
parties up as examples for public edification and guidance.3
The Judicial Chamber's choice of the parental format is a natural and
understandable response to Russia's distinctive conditions. Parental law is
a familiar approach, deeply rooted in Russian history. It seems ideally suited
to the current transitional period. It recognizes the embryonic nature of
Russian democracy and legality and the need for gradual change and devel-
opment. It appropriately calls for revolution from below rather than above.
It seeks to create a new legal culture by nurturing and transforming popular
law-consciousness over time through education, persuasion, and guidance.
At the same time, the parental model's protective emphasis also fits
today's Russia. It offers a theoretical framework for safeguarding the
Russian citizenry and state from the inevitable dislocations and crises of the
transitional era. In particular, it provides a rationale for swift, decisive
action against those who would exploit gaps in changing legal and political
structures to harm the Russian public, government, and reform process.
Yet, despite these advantages, the Judicial Chamber's parental conversa-
tion has not thus far met with an enthusiastic reception. Its intended audi-
ence has often balked at participation. Media and government officials have
routinely resisted the Judicial Chamber's guidance and correction and have
challenged its very legitimacy and authority to act.3"' The parental tone of
Judicial Chamber opinions appears to alienate many readers 89 Indeed, there
is some empirical evidence that contemporary Russians tend to react with
intense hostility and "passionate anger" to texts they consider patronizing and
demeaning to their intellect.39 The Judicial Chamber's blending of legal and
ethical norms and techniques, which is such a central feature of the parental
model, seems to be another source of sensitivity and concern. For many in
post-Soviet Russia, this approach raises the specter of a return to the "dark
era" of extralegal tribunals and censorship bodies. 39 As a result, some argue
that the one redeeming feature of the Judicial Chamber is its very lack of
enforcement powers.
387. See Decision No. 69, supra note 139 ("not[ing] the intolerable inaction" by several
prison employees during illegal filming of convicts).
388. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
389. See Batygin, supra note 83; Klimov, supra note 12.
390. See Richard D. Anderson, Jr. et al., Words Matter: Linguistic Conditions for Democ-
racy in Russia, 54 SLAVIc REV. 869, 893-94 (1995).
391. See Nikitinsldi, supra note 108 (arguing that Judicial Chamber's broad jurisdiction and
powers, including enforcement of "generally-recognized ethical norms," creates potential for it
to become censorship organ).
392. But see Nikita Vainonen, There Is a Court, But Where Is the Case?, Ross. VESn, Mar.
23, 1995, at 2, transuaed in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Apr. 7, 1995, at 35 (criticizing Judicial Chamber's
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Nonetheless, the Judicial Chamber continues to receive appeals and
petitions from Russian media representatives, government officials, and
citizens. It issues and publishes opinions on a wide variety of mass media-
related topics. It remains the most consistent source of interpretation of
constitutional provisions on expressive, information, and press freedoms.
The Judicial Chamber has even seen its jurisdiction expanded recently to
include resolution of disputes arising from media coverage of national
election campaigns.393 Thus, it may be too early to rule out the Judicial
Chamber and its ultimate impact on Russian legal culture.
The critical challenge for the Judicial Chamber today, then, is to per-
suade the Russian public at large to accept its "invitation" to engage in a
parental conversation about law. It cannot compel participation. At the very
least, it must establish its own credentials to serve as parent and teacher.
This task could be made considerably easier if the Judicial Chamber could
point to formal constitutional recognition and clarification of its status in the
Russian political and legal systems.
Even more profoundly, the Judicial Chamber must demonstrate to its
intended audience the legitimacy and viability of the parental approach for
post-Soviet Russia. To do so, it must present arguments that are both
backward- and forward-looking. It must establish, even "invent, "394 linkages
with positive traditions of the Russian past and, at the same time, show value
for the Russian future. In short, the Judicial Chamber must make a con-
certed effort to secure widespread public support, understanding, and in-
volvement. Otherwise, its conversation about law will be a soliloquy.
VI. Concluding Remarks on Comparative Law Translation
of Methodology
Comparative law has long been the orphan of legal academia, its practi-
tioners dismissed as mere translators of foreign legal phenomena and its
lack of enforcement powers).
393. See Instructions on the Procedure of the Allocation to Candidates for the Office of
President of the Russian Federation, Electoral Associations, and Voters' Action Committees of
Air Time on Channels of State Television and Radio Companies and the Publication of Campaign
Material in Periodical Print Publications 4.5-4.6 (Apr. 5, 1996), Ross. GAzETA, Apr. 17, 1996,
at 5, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Apr. 23, 1996, at 14, 21 (assigning Judicial Chamber authority
to hear disputes related to media coverage of presidential election campaign); Media Court
Swamped with Complaints about Election Broadcasts (ITAR-TASS broadcast, Nov. 17, 1995),
translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC Broadcast, Nov. 19, 1995) (discussing
Judicial Chamber's functions during parliamentary elections).
394. For a discussion of how nations "invent" or "rediscover" a history or culture, see
generally BENEDICTANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983); THE INVENTION OFTRADITION
(E.J. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger eds., 1983); and A.D. SMITH, THEORIES OF NATIONAUSM (1983).
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scholarly product tagged with the lethal label of "descriptive. "395 The result
today is considerable "methodological anxiety"" in the field as comparative
law scholars search for the grand theory,3" paradigm, or model that will at
long last secure respect and acceptance of their work. Not surprisingly,
many scholars have turned directly to mainstream U.S. legal literature for
inspiration. Recent articles on comparative and foreign law topics have
applied law and economics,3 98 critical race theory,"' rhetorical analysis,'
feminist jurisprudence,"° and systems analysis' with mixed success. This
Article is no exception.
395. See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995) (setting out critiques of comparative law scholarship and
resulting "malaise" and "lack of confidence" in field).
396. Crapanzano, supra note 69, at 51.
397. For an outstanding discussion of the danger of this quest, see generally William
P. Alford, On the Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REv. 945
(1986).
398. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996) (providing law and economics approach to Russian corporate
law); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN.
L. REv. 73 (1995) (discussing law and economics analysis of German, Japanese, and U.S.
systems); Paul B. Stephan El, Toward a Positive Theory of Privatization - Lessons from
Soviet-2ype Economies, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 173 (1996) (applying law and economics
to privatization of Soviet-type economies).
399. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2341-48 (1989) (discussing "emerging acceptance of the
victim's story" in international and foreign prohibitions against hate speech); Adrien Katherine
Wing & Eunice P. De Carvalho, Black South African Women: Toward Equal Rights, 8 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 57 (1995) (applying critical race theory to South Africa).
400. See Moran, supra note 71 (providing rhetorical analysis of Canadian and U.S. hate
speech opinions); Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, Economic Rights and an International
Text: "A Miracle for Breakfast," 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 433 (1993) (using rhetorical analysis of
international economic rights provisions).
401. See Sharon K. Horn, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights Specter and
Thoughts Towards (An)other Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 249 (1991-92) (taking
feminist approach to study female infanticide in China); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape,
Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1994) (providing feminist
analysis of rape in Bosnia); Margaret Y. K. Woo, Biology and Equality: Challenge for
Feminism in the Socialist and the Liberal State, 42 EMORY L.J. 143 (1993) (using feminist
analysis of women's rights in China and U.S.).
402. See Todd R. Benson, Taking Security in China: Approaching U.S. Practices?, 21
YALE J. INT'L L. 183 (1996) (providing systems analysis of secured transactions in China);
Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and
Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 267
(1994) (applying systems approach to U.S. and Canadian reorganizations).
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In this Article, I used two methodologies developed by U.S. legal
scholars for the study of U.S. judicial opinions - narrative analysis and
discourse analysis - to examine Russian Judicial Chamber opinions.
Through narrative analysis, I sought to identify the recurring plots and
characters in the stories told by the Judicial Chamber about media dissemina-
tion of harmful speech. Narrative analysis revealed a disturbing portrait of
post-Soviet Russia as a society out of control, a naive citizenry under con-
stant assault from irresponsible media yet largely unprotected by a young,
inexperienced government, 3 It presented the Judicial Chamber as the
reluctant savior of Russia, compelled by dire necessity to serve as the last
line of defense against the barrage of subversive, immoral, deceptive, and
dangerous materials that threaten the future of post-Soviet democracy.
40
4
Through discourse analysis, I sought to identify the Judicial Chamber's
techniques for communicating with parties, the legal community, the media,
the government, and the general public. This analysis focused on the type
of conversation between the Judicial Chamber and the reader of its opinions.
Initially, my goal was to choose between the two types of conversation
presented by White in the American context - "democratic" or "authoritar-
ian."o I ultimately concluded, however, that neither described the Judicial
Chamber's conversation nearly as well as the "parental" model developed by
Berman in 1950 to explain the distinctive Russian approach to law.4°6
In the process of applying narrative analysis and discourse analysis, I
discovered some of the rewards and risks of importing U.S. legal methodol-
ogy into the comparative law field. On the positive side, I found that at least
two of these methodologies can be valuable tools for communicating foreign
legal phenomena to lay and expert audiences alike. Both narrative analysis
and discourse analysis proved successful as techniques for bringing foreign
judicial opinions to life. They revealed subtle nuances, unstated premises,
and larger context in a format accessible to even the nonspecialist American
reader. In so doing, these methodologies furthered a central ethnographic
mission of the comparative law scholar - to "render the foreign familiar. "40
I learned that application of U.S. methodology can yield new insights
for the foreign law expert as well. Specifically, narrative analysis and dis-
course analysis highlighted aspects of Judicial Chamber policy and practice
that more conventional research and analytical techniques might have
missed - aspects that the Judicial Chamber seldom expresses explicitly in
403. See supra Part IV.A-B.
404. See supra Part V.C.
405. See supra Part V.B.1.
406. See supra Part V.B.2.
407. Crapanzano, supra note 69, at 52.
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its opinions and commentaries. These include the Judicial Chamber's
definition of itself, its relationship with its audience, its place in the post-
Soviet political and legal systems, and its "blended" solution to Russia's
"free press" problems." 8 Focusing on the tone, language, and style of
Judicial Chamber opinions was particularly useful in identifying potential
tensions and conflicts in the Judicial Chamber's practice and in understand-
ing public resistance and criticism of its efforts.'
More generally, application of narrative analysis and discourse analysis
to Judicial Chamber opinions helped shed light on the overall progress of
post-Soviet legal reform. The Judicial Chamber's harmful speech stories
proved to be a rich source of information on Russia's concrete successes and
continuing problems in implementing its new post-Soviet Constitution and
legislation. In highlighting institutional, procedural, and attitudinal impedi-
ments, these stories also pointed to possible directions for future reform of
the legal system.410 A narrative analysis of Judicial Chamber opinions
offered insights as well into changing definitions and relationships between
citizen, state, and media in the post-Soviet era. It suggested that Russia is
still only in the early stages of transition toward its ideal democracy founded
on the rule of law.4"
Analysis of Judicial Chamber discourse may ultimately yield even more
fundamental lessons for the Russian law specialist about post-Soviet legal
reform efforts. By focusing on how rather than what the Judicial Chamber
communicates in its opinions, this approach revealed a surprising but consis-
tent pattern of "parental" conversation about law between the Judicial
Chamber and the reader.412 Discourse analysis in turn may provide impor-
tant signals of how Russia's current leadership proposes to address the
critical problem of creating a legal culture. Indeed, preliminary research
suggests that the re-emergence of "parental law" is by no means confined to
the Judicial Chamber context. For example, as I have discussed else-
where,413 the Russian president and legislature have already adopted what
can only be described as a parental theory of information rights. Thus,
Berman's parental model may also offer the Russian law specialist the best
framework for studying the evolving post-Soviet legal reform process as a
whole.
408. See supra Part IV.C.
409. See supra Part V.B.2.a.
410. See supra notes 265-83 and accompanying text.
411. See supra Part V.A.
412. See supra Part V.B.2.
413. Foster, supra note 7, at pt. IV.
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On a more sobering note, however, analysis of Judicial Chamber
discourse and narrative also revealed the very real dangers in applying U.S.
methodology to foreign legal systems. I discovered that use of such method-
ology can exacerbate the comparative law scholar's already "despairingly
difficult"414 "problem of translation."415 It can entail multiple layers and
forms of translation, each rife with possibilities for distortion. My experi-
ence illustrates the types of translations and associated problems that a
scholar may confront in using U.S. methodology in a foreign context.
In applying discourse analysis and narrative analysis to Judicial Cham-
ber opinions, I encountered five distinct translations, each of which pre-
sented theoretical and practical difficulties. "Every act of communica-
tion.., is an act of translation." 416 Thus, the first translation I confronted
was the central topic of this Article - the Judicial Chamber's communication
with its audience through harmful speech opinions and the audience's recep-
tion of that communication. This process of communication and reception
constituted a classic example of a translation within a single language and
community.417 What was problematic was my role as analyst of this transla-
tion. In essence, my task was to evaluate how a Russian judicial body
communicated through Russian-language texts with a Russian audience and
the likely response of that audience. Yet, my vantage point was that of an
outside observer, at a vast spatial, linguistic, and cultural distance from both
the author and reader of Judicial Chamber opinions.
Only compounding these difficulties was the Article's second transla-
tion - the translation of American methodology to Russian context. This
translation required the use of methodologies that had been developed for the
study of U.S. judicial opinions but never tested in or adapted for specific
Russian conditions. Thus, there was a real risk that application of U.S.
discourse and narrative techniques would yield an inaccurate, incomplete,
or even distorted picture of Russian legal phenomena. One concern was that
use of these methodologies might lead me to read into Judicial Chamber
opinions implicit meanings or patterns that were in fact unwarranted.418
414. Lessig, supra note 68, at 1266.
415. Asad, supra note 67, at 142. For discussion of comparative law problems of transla-
tion, see generally Ainsworth, Categories and Culture, supra note 69; and Rodolfo Sacco,
Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991).
416. Lessig, supra note 68, at 1190.
417. See GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION
47, 414 (1975) (discussing relationship between translation and "the process of communication
and reception" and concluding that "inside or between languages, human communication
equals translation").
418. For a discussion of this "tendency to read the implicit in alien cultures," see Asad,
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Another potential danger was that I might become so locked into methodol-
ogy that I could miss key points or lessons of cases.4 19 At worst, I might
unconsciously distort Russian reality to fit pre-existing American methodol-
ogy.
420
I confronted a third translation when I attempted to record the findings
of my analysis of Judicial Chamber discourse and narrative. My task at this
stage was to translate a peculiarly Russian experience into a language and
format accessible to an American audience. As a preliminary matter, I
sought to make Judicial Chamber opinions available to a non-Russian-speak-
ing audience. This entailed two additional translations - linguistic and
cultural. I had to translate Russian-language texts into English and at the
same time convey discrete cultural meanings and "modes of thought."
421
Many scholars have justly described this effort at linguistic and cultural
translation as "impossible."4' As James Boyd White has warned, "[i]t
requires... an attempt to be perfectly at home in two worlds, an attempt
supra note 67, at 160-63. See also Paul Bohannan, Ethnography and Comparison in Legal
Anthropology, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 401, 414-15 (Laura Nader ed., 1969)
(discussing problem of "implying" that ideas and analyses from ethnographic literature "are
in the subject culture").
419. For similar concerns about the narrative format, see Lawrence Stone, 7he Revival
of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History, 85 PAST & PRESENT 1, 3 (1979) (claiming
narrative format focuses on the "single cell" at expense of social and political context).
420. For superb discussions of the distortions caused by application of Western frame-
works to non-Western legal systems, see generally Ainsworth, Categories and Culture, supra
note 69; Ainsworth, Interpreting Sacred Texts, supra note 69; William P. Alford, The
Inscrutable Occidental: Implications of Roberto Unger's Use and Abuse of the Chinese Past,
64 TEX. L. REV. 915 (1986); William P. Alford, Of Arsenic and Old Laws: Looking Anew at
Criminal Justice in Late Imperial China, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1180 (1984); James A. Fanto, The
Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate
Governance, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 119 (1996); Stanislaw Pomorski, The PiOfalls of
Cross-Cultural Research, 7 CRIM. L.F. 229 (1996); and Kim Lane Scheppele, The History of
Normalcy: Rethinking Legal Autonomy and the Relative Dependence of Law at the End of the
Soviet Empire, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 627 (1996).
421. Godfrey Lienhardt, Modes of Thought, in THE INSTrrTUONS OF PRIMITIVE SOCIETY
95 (E.E. Evans-Pritchard et al. eds., 1954). See generally Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge:
Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in CLIFFORD GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 167-234 (1983) (discussing impor-
tance of cultural translation in comparative cross-cultural study).
422. See WHrrE, supra note 13, at 235 (describing "the impossibility of 'translation"');
J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131,
1158 (1994) ("But translations are always imperfect. They never fully convey the sense of the
original. Hence the very necessity of translation renders it impossible fully to speak in the
language of the Other."); Edmund R. Leach, Ourselves and Others, TIMES LITERARY SupP.,
July 6, 1973, at 771, 772 (stating "perfect translation is usually impossible").
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that must always fail. ,423 There is always substantial risk that "connotations"
will be "added" or "lost" in the process of linguistic and cross-cultural trans-
lation.424 In the case of Judicial Chamber materials, translation proved
particularly challenging because of the extensive use of idiomatic expressions
rooted in Russian history and culture.'a Often, there were no satisfactory
English-language equivalents to capture the rich texture and range of mean-
ings of the original Russian-language phrases.
Translation of Russian experience into the stories told in this Article
also proved to be problematic. I now had to become storyteller as well as
observer and translator. This new role carried with it its own potential
dangers and distortions. These included the temptations to embellish or
exaggerate for dramatic effect426 and to use material selectively to ensure a
coherent storyline or uniform depiction of characters.427 My major concern
was that by recasting the Russian experience as stories I might leave the
American audience with an unintended negative impression of the Judicial
Chamber and its approach to law.' s Use of the narrative format might also
trivialize this body's significant accomplishments and contributions to the
Russian legal reform process. In my capacity as storyteller, I became
conscious as never before of the comparative law scholar's dual responsibil-
423. James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, in INTERPRETING LAw AND LITERATURE,
supra note 49, at 393, 404.
424. Ainsworth, Interpreting Sacred Texts, supra note 69, at 279 ("[Translation cannot
provide exactly equivalent terms... [because] connotations are invariably added and lost in
translation").
425. Idiomatic, even obscene phrases appear most often in the Judicial Chamber's direct
quotations of material from newspaper articles or broadcast videotapes. See supra note 237
and accompanying text.
426. For a related discussion of the dangers of the narrative format and "the use and
abuse of descriptive rhetoric," see Renato Rosaldo, From the Door of His Tent: The Field-
worker and the Inquisitor, in WRrriNG CULTURE, supra note 67, at 77, 81.
427. See supra note 110 (discussing cases that did not fit general patterns).
428. See Ernest Gellner, Concepts and Society, in RATIONALITY 18,27 (B.R. Wilson ed.,
1970) (discussing unintended negative connotations or bad impressions that may occur in
process of cultural translation). The stories told by the Judicial Chamber, of course, are not
necessarily true. In attempting a comparison, one must, as Walter Weyrauch has pointed out,
compare myth with myth and reality with reality. Walter Otto Weyrauch, Oral Legal
Traditions of Gypsies and Some American Equivalents (Gypsy Law Symposium), 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 407, 412 (1997) ("Myths should be compared with myths, and realities with reali-
ties."). Hence, it would not be appropriate to compare the stories told by the Russian Judicial
Chamber with the reality of contemporary American law. At the same time, it is important
to remember that focusing on U.S. judicial opinions is itself problematic. Due to limited
publication of U.S. opinions, see supra note 22, narrative and discourse analyses of U.S.
decisions may produce a distorted picture of American reality as well.
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ity to audience and foreign legal system. This responsibility weighed partic-
ularly heavy in this case where most of the audience had no access to the
original Russian-language sources and, hence, no means to verify or chal-
lenge my rendition of Judicial Chamber theory and practice.
In conclusion, my experience suggests that U.S. methodologies can be
useful tools for examining foreign legal systems, but that they must be
applied with flexibility, caution, and, above all, sensitivity to context.429 The
ultimate lesson of this Article is that the scholar must be prepared for the
unexpected - the divergences from usual patterns, the spontaneous adap-
tations of methodology to a foreign environment, the new answers to ques-
tions formulated in the American context. Comparative law translation of
methodology, thus, may do more than render the foreign familiar. It may
render the familiar foreign as well.
429. This sensitivity to context, however, may have its own dangers. See BERNHARD
GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAw 72 (1990) ("The
dilemma is this: the more we try to catch the foreign law in all its individuality, as we must,
the more we appreciate its cultural and societal context, the less possible it seems to compare
it with others.").
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